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New Deal Changes in the Banking Structure and
Monetary Standard
THE New Deal period offers a striking contrast in monetary and banking
matters. On the one hand, monetary policy was accorded little importance
in affecting the course of economic affairs and the policy actually followed
was hesitant and almost entirely passive. On the other hand, the founda-
tions of the American financial structure and the character of the mone-
tary standard were profoundly modified. Both developments were direct
outgrowths of the dramatic experiences of the preceding years. The ap-
parent failure of monetary policy to stem the depression led to the relega-
tion of money to a minor role in affecting the course of economic events.
At the same time, the collapse of the banking system produced a demand
for remedial legislation that led to the enactment of federal deposit in-
surance, to changes in the powers of the Federal Reserve System, and to
closer regulation of banks and other financial institutions. The depressed
state of the economy, the large preceding fall in prices and, despite those
conditions, the poor competitive position of our exports thanks to the
depreciation of the pound and other currencies, all combined with
the New Deal atmosphere to foster experimentation with the monetary
standard. The experiments involved temporary departure from gold, a
period of flexible and depreciating exchange rates, silver purchases,
subsequent nominal return to gold at a higher price for gold, and drastic
changes in the terms and conditions under which gold could be held and
obtained by private parties.
This chapter describes the changes that were made in the banking
structure (section 1) and in the monetary standard (section 2). The next
chapter discusses the monetary policies followed during the New Deal
period.
1. Changes in the Banking Structure
Three kinds of legislative measures were enacted after the 1933 banking
panic: emergency measures designed to reopen closed banks and to
strengthen banks permitted to open; measures that effected a more last-
ing alteration in the commercial banking structure—the most important
being federal deposit insurance—and, more generally, in the financial
structure; measures that altered the structure and powers of the Federal
Reserve System. In addition, the banking system was affected in importantNEW DEAL CHANGES
ways by the reaction of the banks themselves, independently of legislation,
to their experiences during the prior contraction.
EMERGENCY MEASURES
We have already had occasion to refer to the Emergency Banking Act of
March 9, 1933. Title I of the act approved and confirmed the action taken
by President Roosevelt in proclaiming a nationwide bank holiday from
March 6 to March 9, inclusive, under the wartime measure of October 6,
'1917, which conferred broad powers over banking and currency upon
the President of the United States.
1 Title I, further, amended the wartime
measure to empower the President in time of national emergency to regu-
late or prohibit the payment of deposits by all banking institutions. During
the period of emergency proclaimed by the President, member banks were
forbidden to transact any banking business unless authorized by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury with the approval of the President.
Title II of the act provided for the reopening and operation on a
restricted basis of certain national banks with impaired assets, which
under existing laws would have' been placed in receivership and liquidated.
Conservators were to be appointed for those banks by the Comptroller of
the Currency. The Comptroller could direct the conservators to make
available for immediate withdrawal amounts of existing deposits he
deemed it safe to release; and the conservators, subject to his approval,
could receive new deposits, available for immediate withdrawal without
restriction and segregated from other liabilities of the bank. The conserva-
tors were also to be charged with the duty of preparing plans of reorgani-
zation, subject to the Comptroller's approval, which could be put into
effect with the consent of 75 per cent of a bank's depositors and other
creditors or of two-thirds of the stockholders.
Title III provided for issues of nonassessable preferred stock by
national banks to be sold to the general public, or the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC), which might also buy similar issues from
state banks.
Title IV provided for emergency issues of Federal Reserve Bank notes
up to the face value of direct obligations of the United States deposited
as security, or up to 90 per cent of the estimated value of eligible paper
and bankers' acceptances acquired under the provisions of the Emergency
Banking Act. After the emergency recognized by the Presidential procla-
mation of March 6, 1933, had terminated, Federal Reserve Bank notes
could be issued only on the security of direct obligations of the United
States. Over $200 million of Federal Reserve Bank notes were issued
1 By a proclamation issued on Dec. 30, 1933, the President relinquished jurisdic-
tion over nonmember banks assumed by the federal government at the time of his
proclamation of a banking holiday.NEW DEAL CHANGES 5
in 1933. Thereafter until the war, they were retired as fast as returned
from circulation. The liability for those notes was assumed by the Treasury
in March 1935.
Under Title IV, Federal Reserve Banks were also authorized, until
March 3, 1934, to make advances in exceptional and exigent circum-
stances to member banks on their own notes on the security of any ac-
ceptable assets. That provision superseded the one regarding advances to
member banks in the Glass-Steagall Act (see Chapter 7, footnote 26).
The provision was extended by Presidential proclamation until March
3, 1935, when it expired. The provision adopted in the Banking Act of
1935 omitted the requirement that advances be made only in exceptional
and exigent circumstances and to member banks whose other means of
obtaining accommodation from Federal Reserve Banks were exhausted
(see below, pp. 447-448).
Opening of Banks
Under the authority of the Emergency Banking Act, President Roose-
velt issued a proclamation on March 9 continuing the banking holiday,
and an executive order on March 10 empowering the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue licenses to member banks to reopen. Every member
bank was directed to make application for a license to the Federal Reserve
Bank of its district, which would serve as an agent of the Secretary in
granting licenses. The executive order also empowered state banking
authorities to reopen their sound banks that were not members of the
Federal Reserve System. Another executive order dated March 18 granted
state banking authorities permission to appoint conservators for unlicensed
state member banks when consistent with state law.
In a statement to the press on March 11 and a radio address on March
12, the President announced the program for reopening licensed banks on
March 13, 14, and 15. Member banks licensed by the Secretary of
the Treasury as well as nonmember banks licensed by state banking
authorities "opened for normal business on an unrestricted basis, except
so far as affected by legal contracts between the banks and depositors with
respect to withdrawals or notice of withdrawals"
2 on March 13, in the
twelve Federal Reserve Bank cities; on March 14, in some 250 cities
having active, recognized clearing house associations; and on March 15,
elsewhere.
Effect on Number and Deposits of Banks
At the turn of the year, two months before the banking holiday, there
had been nearly 17,800 commercial banks in operation, by the definition
of banks then in use (Table 13). When the banking holiday was ter-
* Statement by the Secretary of the Treasury to the superintendent of banks of
each state, Mar. 11, 1933, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Mar. 1933, p. 128.NEW DEAL CHANGES
TABLE 13
NUMBER AND DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS BEFORE
AND AFTER BANKING HOLIDAY




1. Active commercial banks
2. Not classified as banks by
1932 definition
Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1932
3. Active commercial banks
4. Suspended, merged, or
liquidated between
Dec. 31, 1932, and
Mar. 15, 1933
5. Total commercial banks
(line 3 minus line 4)
6. Licensed
7. Unlicensed
8. Licensed plus unlicensed
(line 6 plus line 7)
9. Discrepancy














































NOTE: Where reported figures are not available, estimates are shown only for items
useful in deriving line 8, as described in source notes.
SOURCE, BY LINE
1. Col. 1: Interpolation between June 1932 and June 1933 figures, shown in All-Bank
Statistics, p. 37; the interpolation was based on June and Dec. 1932 and June 1933
figures on number of banks in Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 19. The difference
between the latter and former series at June dates was interpolated along a straight
line and added to the Dec. figure in ibid.
Col. 2: Table A-l.
Col. 3: Interpolation between June 1932 and June 1933 figures, shown in All-Bank
Statistics, p. 36; the interpolation was based on June and Dec. 1932 and June 1933
figures on deposits of banks in Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 19. The ratio of
the Dec. figure to its own inter-June straight-line trend value was multiplied by
the straight-line trend value computed at the end of Dec. between the June figures
in All-Bank Statistics.
2. Col. 1: Line 1 minus line 3.
Col. 2: The excess of demand deposits adjusted plus time deposits for June dates,
1932-33, in All-Bank Statistics (pp. 60 and 36), over the corresponding sums in
Banking and Monetary Statistics (p. 34) was obtained; an estimate of the excess was
interpolated for Dec. along a straight line. An estimate was then added for deposits
(continued)NEW DEAL CHANGES 7
NOTES to TABLE 13 (continued)
in commercial banks included in the Banking and Monetary Statistics series but not
included in the Federal Reserve Bulletin (FRB) series for 1932 (referred to in the table
as defined in FRB, 1932, ). FRB in 1932 did not show adjusted deposits, so only a
comparison of total deposits excluding interbank deposits in this source (Dec. 1933,
p. 746) and in Banking and Monetary Statistics (p. 19) is possible. A rough conversion
to adjusted deposits was made of excess of total deposits in ibid, over the FRB
figure, and added to the excess of adjusted deposits in All-Bank Statistics over the
series in Banking and Monetary Statistics.
3. Col. 1: FRB, Dec. 1933, p. 746.
Col. 2: Line 1 minus line 2.
4. Cols. 1, 3: FRB, Sept. 1937, p. 867.
6. Col. 1: Sum of figures for licensed member banks on Mar. 15, 1933 (FRB, June
1935, p. 404), and for licensed nonmember banks on Mar. 22, 1933 (Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1933, p. 24).
Col. 2: Figure for end of Mar. from Table A-l: (a) adjusted to Mar. 15, by multi-
plying by ratio of total deposits of licensed member banks on Mar. 15 to corre-
sponding figure for Mar. 29 (25,554/25,850, FRB, June 1935, p. 404 and Apr. 1933,
p. 216); and (b) adjusted to 1932 definition of banks by subtracting line 2, col. 2,
reduced 10 per cent for assumed change in deposits, Dec. 31, 1932-Mar. 15, 1933.
Col. 3: Sum of figures for licensed member banks on Mar. 15, 1933 (FRB, June
1935, p. 404), for licensed nonmember banks on Apr. 12, 1933 (FRB), minus an
estimate of the deposits in nonmember banks that were licensed between Mar. 15
and Apr. 12. The figures are deposits as of Dec. 31, 1932, scaled down 10 per cent
for assumed change in deposits, Dec. 31, 1932-Mar. 15, 1933.
7. Cols. 1,3: Derived as the sum of:
Deposits
Number ($ millions)
(a) Unlicensed member banks on
Mar. 15, 1933 (Federal Reserve Bulletin) 1,621 2,867
(b) Unlicensed nonmember banks on
Apr. 12, 1933 (FRB) 2,959 1,321
(c) Fall in unlicensed nonmember banks,
Mar. 15-Apr. 12, 1933 850 325
5,430 4,513
For item c, the changes, Mar. 15-Apr. 12, 1933, were estimated as follows:
Number
(1) Licensed nonmember banks,
Mar. 22 (Annual Report,
Treasury, 1933, p. 24) 6,800
(2) Licensed nonmember banks,
Apr. 12 (FRB, June 1935, p. 404) 7,392
(3) Liquidations of licensed and
unlicensed nonmember banks,
Mar. 16-Apr. 30 (FRB,
Apr. 1934, p. 251) 258
Change in number, (2) + (3) - (1) 850
We had no information on deposits corresponding to numbers shown above. We
arbitrarily assumed that the change in deposits in licensed nonmember banks,
Mar. 22-Apr. 12, 1933, on a per-bank basis, approximated the change in deposits
of licensed member banks, on a per-bank basis, Mar. 15-Apr. 12, 1933. The ratio
for member banks between those two dates was 105.0. We used 104.0 for non-
member banks, multiplied average deposits on Apr. 12 by this ratio to get the
(continued)O NEW DEAL CHANGES
average on Mar. 22, and multiplied again by the number of licensed nonmember
banks to get estimated deposits in licensed nonmember banks on Mar. 22.
Deposits
($ millions)
(1) Licensed nonmember banks, Mar. 22 (as above) 4,803
(2) Licensed nonmember banks, Apr. 12 (FRB,
June 1935, p. 404) 5,020
(3) Liquidations of licensed and unlicensed nonmember
banks, Mar. 16-Apr. 30 (FRB, Apr. 1934, p. 251) 108
Change in deposits, (2) + (3) - (1) 325
The figure for number of banks needed no further adjustment. That for deposits
needed to be reduced SI 61 million to correct for overstatement of deposits in non-
member banks; and by $321 million, for overstatement of deposits in member
banks. The deposits of nonmember banks on Apr. 12, 1933, and of member banks
on Mar. 15, 1933, are the deposits those banks had on Dec. 31, 1932. We have a
measure of the overstatement for nonmember banks on June 30, 1933: data on
number of and deposits in unlicensed member and nonmember banks in Federal
Reserve Bulletin, June 1935, p. 404, where member bank deposits are the deposits
those banks held on June 30, 1933, and nonmember bank deposits are the deposits
those banks held on Dec. 31, 1932. These figures may be compared with the data in
All-Bank Statistics, p. 72 (6 mutual savings banks with estimated $7 million in
deposits have been deducted to obtain all commercial bank figures), which pre-
sumably show actual June 30, 1933, nonmember as well as member bank figures.
The Dec. 1932 data for nonmember banks overstate deposits on June 30,1933, by
12.2 per cent. Applying this percentage to line b, above, yields $161 million.
The measure of the overstatement for member banks is also based on an end-of-
June 1933 comparison. For June 28, 1933, deposits in unlicensed member banks
are the deposits those banks had on Dec. 31, 1932 (FRB, July 1933, p. 453). For
June 30, 1933, we have actual deposits in those banks on this date (FRB, June
1935, p. 404). There is an 11.2 percentage difference between the two sets of
figures. Applying this percentage to line a, above, yields $321 million.
7. Col. 2: Entry for unlicensed in col. 3 divided by ratio, line 6, col. 4.
9. Col. 1: Line 3 minus the sum of lines 4 and 8. Any of the components, lines 4, 6,
and 7, may contribute to the discrepancy of 41 banks, based on the total shown
in line 3. (In Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 19, the total figure is 17,802, pre-
sumably because of the addition of certain private banks that did not report to
state banking authorities and of institutions earlier not classified as commercial
banks.) Line 4, for example, gives revised figures. Earlier sources showed the num-
ber of suspended banks, Jan. 1-Mar. 15, 1933, as 462 (see Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Apr. 1934, p. 251). If 15 banks were excluded from the number of suspensions by
the later source because they were reopened by June 30, 1933 (banks not licensed
after the holiday were not considered suspensions if reopened by that date), our
total of active banks in Dec. 1932 derived from lines 4, 6, and 7 would be too small
by that number. Both lines 6 and 7 are partly estimated. The use of Mar. 22 figures
for licensed nonmembers may slightly exaggerate the total for all banks in line 6.
The figure for unlicensed nonmember banks included in line 7 was obtained indi-
rectly and may well be too small not only by the discrepancy of 41 but also by a
larger number, if line 6 is an overstatement.
minated, only 17,300 remained to be recorded in the statistics, and fewer
than 12,000 of those were licensed to open and do business. The more
than 5,000 unlicensed banks were left in a state of limbo, to be either
reopened later—the fate of some 3,000—or to be closed for good and
either liquidated or consolidated with other banks—the fate of over 2,000NEW DEAL CHANGES
TABLE 14
DISPOSITION BY DECEMBER 31, 1936, OF COMMERCIAL BANKS NOT LICENSED TO OPEN AT
TERMINATION OF BANKING HOLIDAY, MARCH 15, 1933

































































































° Deposits are unadjusted for interbank deposits, float, or seasonal.
6 For nonmember banks, June 27, 1934.
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1, 5) Sums of data for member and nonmember banks.
Mar. 15, 1933: Unrounded figures from notes to Table 13, line 7, col. 1.
June 30, 1933: All-Bank Statistics, p. 72 (6 mutual savings banks with estimated
$7 million in deposits deducted to obtain all unlicensed commercial bank
figures). Other dates: Federal Reserve Bulletin, Jan. 1935, p. 62. Zero is shown
for Dec. 31, 1936, although there were still 10 unlicensed banks, with $1,748,000
deposits, neither granted licenses to reopen nor placed in liquidation or re-
ceivership on this date (FRB, Sept. 1937, p. 867). These banks are treated here
as if they were in receivership by this date.
(2) Change in col. 1.
(3) Col. 2 minus col. 4.
(4, 8) Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1934, pp. 785-790; 1935,
pp. 807-808. Figure for Dec. 31, 1936, is a residual obtained by subtracting
sum of data through Dec. 30, 1934, from total for period through Dec. 31,
1936, in FRB, Sept. 1937, p. 867.
(6) Change in col. 5.
(7) Col. 6 minus col. 8. Deposits in banks granted licenses, July 1, 1933, to Dec. 31,
1936- (FRB), amounted to $716 million compared with total of $867 million
shown here.10 NEW DEAL CHANGES
(Table 14). The changes in deposits were only slightly less drastic. From
December 1932 to March 15, 1933, deposits in banks open for business
fell by one-sixth. Seventy per cent of the decline was accounted for by
the deposits on the books of banks not licensed to open, yet not finally
disposed of (Table 13, lines 3-7, col. 2).
The banks licensed to open operated generally without restrictions,
though in some cases legal contracts were in effect limiting withdrawals
by depositors to a specified fraction of the amounts due them.
3 Many of
the unlicensed banks, in their turn, were open for a limited range of
business, with conservators authorized to receive new deposits subject to
the order of the depositor and segregated from other funds. The line
between licensed and unlicensed banks was therefore less sharp in prac-
tice than in the records.
Fate of Unlicensed Banks
Table 14 shows what happened to the unlicensed banks over the next
several years. By the end of June 1933 over 2,300 of the banks, holding
nearly half the total restricted deposits, had been disposed of—nearly
2,000 banks were licensed to reopen, 388 closed. However, the closed
banks had decidedly the larger volume of deposits, and this was to remain
true for the rest of the period as well, so that the three-fifths of the banks
ultimately reopened held only three-eighths of the deposits.
The RFC played a major role in the restoration of the banking sys-
tem as it had in the futile attempts to shore it up before the banking
holiday. It invested a total of over $1 billion in bank capital—one-third
of the total capital of all banks in the United States in 1933—and pur-
chased capital issues of 6,139 banks, or almost one-half the number of
banks.
4 In addition, it made loans to open banks for distribution to de-
3 "Deposits in licensed banks the payment of which has been deferred beyond
the time originally contemplated" amounted to $103 million in June 1933, $55
million in June 1934, and were apparently zero in June 1935 (sums of national
and nonnational bank data from Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report,
1933, pp. 420, 629; 1934, pp. 523, 755).
* The RFC was authorized to buy preferred stock and capital notes and deben-
tures of banks by the Emergency Banking Act and an amendment to it. Most of the
banks in which it invested were those originally permitted to resume operations
only on a limited withdrawal basis (Jesse H. Jones [with Edward Angly], Fifty
Billion Dollars, New York, Macmillan, 1951, p. 21). To avoid the suggestion that
RFC investment signified a bank's weakness, some stronger banks which did not
actually need new capital were asked to sell the Corporation a modest amount of
preferred stock or capital notes. According to Jones, fewer than twenty of the
more than six thousand banks into which the RFC put capital actually had no
need of it (p. 34). The capital was invested on the understanding that it would
be retired out of about one-half the net earnings of the banks after payment of
dividends or interest on RFC capital. RFC investment permitted the banks to
charge off losses. Approximately 51 per cent of its investment had been retired
by February 1939 (Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Seven-Year Report to theNEW DEAL CHANGES 11
positors of $187 million and to closed banks of over $900 million, on the
security of the best assets of those institutions. The loans, made after the
banking panic, were in addition to loans of $951 million to open banks
and of $80 million to closed banks made before the banking panic.
5 In
aggregate, 5,816 open banks and 2,773 closed banks obtained RFC loans
totaling more than $2 billion. RFC and other federal authorities doubtless
also played a role in fostering bank mergers, particularly purchase by
larger banks of smaller banks with doubtful portfolios, that served further
to reduce the number of individual banks and, hopefully, to strengthen
their solvency.
Effects on Money Stock Measures
The banking holiday and its aftermath make our recorded figures on
the money stock even less reliable than for other times as indicators of
some consistent economic magnitude meriting the label money. Before
the banking holiday, many banks had imposed restrictions on the use of
deposits in an attempt to avoid suspension. Those deposits are counted in
full in the recorded money stock. On the other hand, after the holiday,
both restricted and unrestricted deposits in unlicensed banks are excluded
completely from the recorded money stock.
6 The shift in treatment, which
can hardly correspond to a shift in economic significance, is the major
factor behind the sharp decline in the recorded figures in March 1933.
Consistent accounting would require exclusion of restricted deposits
throughout or their inclusion throughout. Criteria of economic significance
would call for including in the money stock a fraction of restricted
deposits, the fraction fluctuating over time. Any one of these courses
would eliminate the discontinuous drop in our series in March 1933 and
yield a milder decline before March and a milder rise thereafter.
Unfortunately, there is no adequate statistical basis for estimating
President and the Congress of the U.S., February 2, 1932, to February 1, 1939,
p. 5).
5 RFC, Seven-Year Report, pp. 4, 6, for total loans. For RFC loans from Feb. 2,
1932, to Mar. 3, 1933, see RFC, Summaries of the Activities of the RFC and Its
Condition as of December 31, 1935, GPO, Jan. 1936, p. 14. Loans for distribution
to depositors in closed banks were relatively small before the banking holiday be-
cause the original RFC Act limited their aggregate amount to $200 million. An
amendment June 14, 1933, removed the limit. Loans to going banks were rela-
tively small after the banking holiday because they were superseded by RFC
capital purchases.
6 The restricted deposits in licensed banks referred to in footnote 3 above are
included in Table A-l. Figures on unrestricted deposits in unlicensed banks are
available only for national banks at call dates June 1933-Dec. 1934 (Comptroller
of the Currency, Annual Report, 1933, p. 649; 1934, p. 776; 1935, p. 806). The
largest amount of unrestricted deposits recorded was $77 million in June 1933,
8 per cent of frozen deposits. The absolute amount declined along with frozen
deposits in unlicensed banks, the ratio of the first to the second remaining in the
neighborhood of a tenth.12 NEW DEAL CHANGES
restricted deposits before March 1933 ;
7 hence they cannot easily be ex-
cluded. Table 15 and Chart 34 therefore bridge the discontinuity at
that month by including restricted deposits throughout to derive an
alternative estimate of the stock of money similar in construction before
and after the holiday. This alternative estimate is compared with the
estimate in our basic tables.
Neither of these two estimates is economically ideal. The alternative
estimate may be viewed as setting an upper limit to the "ideal" estimate
of the money stock, and our money stock figures in Table A-l as setting a
lower limit. We have noted that the figures in Table A-l are not con-
tinuous from February to March 1933, since the figures for February in-
clude restricted deposits and the figures for March exclude them. That
is why a dotted line is used on Chart 34 in connecting the values for
February and March. The alternative estimate at the end of March, how-
ever, is also not strictly continuous with the end-of-February figure, so
a dotted line again is used in connecting the two figures. At the end of
March, depositors in unlicensed banks, for which neither a conservator
nor a receiver had been appointed, had reason to regard deposits in such
T See Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1937, p. 1206, for a discussion of the
extent of the restriction of withdrawals before the banking holiday.
The placing of restrictions on deposit withdrawals, a practice that had been
used in 1931 in the East North Central States, became more prevalent in 1932
as a measure to cope with the steady withdrawal of funds. These restrictions on
deposit withdrawals were usually imposed through 'depositors' agreements' de-
ferring withdrawal of varying percentages of deposits over periods of time
ranging up to five years, certain percentages of deposits to be released at the
end of the first year and additional percentages at the end of the succeeding
years. New business was conducted on an unrestricted basis. Unfortunately,
comprehensive figures are not available to show the number of banks that ob-
tained deposit deferment agreements, or the amount of deposits involved in
such deferment agreements, but from what information is available it appears
that the practice was followed in a number of States during 1931 and 1932.
Another type of bank moratoria that became common during this period,
particularly in the East North Central States, was the reorganization of banks
through the waiver or surrender of a portion of deposits by the depositors. This
was accomplished in some cases through outright contributions by certain of the
depositors, but usually there was a segregation of assets for the benefit of waiving
depositors under a trust agreement, with a right in the bank to substitute assets
during a period of time running generally from two to five years. Figures are
not available at present to show the losses sustained by depositors through this
type of reorganization of distressed banks. . . .
Many banks in a number of places had closed temporarily in 1932 under
special 'banking holidays' declared by civil authorities. The first of a series of
State-wide banking holidays was declared in Nevada at the beginning of
November, 1932. Though originally for a 12-day period, it was subsequently
extended. Early in 1933 more local bank holidays were declared by city
authorities and many existing ones were extended, in order to permit banks
to obtain deposit deferment or waiver agreements and to afford banks an op-
portunity to raise funds and make adjustments necessary to enable them to
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SOURCE: Table 15, cols. 6 and 7, and Table A-l, col. 8.
banks as less akin to cash then they had been before the banking holiday,
even though restricted then. The attempt to achieve continuity with
February by including all deposits in unlicensed banks in March figures
accordingly overstates the money stock even on the concept implicit in
the estimates for the end of February.
8 And that concept itself overstates
8 The figures for currency held by the public in the alternative estimate also in-
volve an overstatement. Table A-l treats vault cash in unlicensed banks, beginning
Mar. 1933, as currency held by the public because unlicensed banks are not
counted as banks. We estimate the amount of vault cash in unlicensed banks to
have been about $50 million at the end of that month, and to have declined
thereafter along with the reduction in deposits in unlicensed banks. Strictly, the
alternative estimate of money stock including deposits in unlicensed banks should
exclude from currency held by the public the vault cash in those banks.16 NEW DEAL CHANGES
the money stock by treating $1 of restricted deposits as strictly on a par
with $1 of unrestricted deposits.
Another defect in our figures traceable to the bank holiday is their
exclusion of perhaps as much as $1 billion of currency substitutes in-
troduced in communities bereft of banking facilities before, during, and
immediately after the panic.
9 To the extent currency substitutes were used
because restricted deposits were unavailable to depositors, the error
of their exclusion from Table A-l before the panic is offset by the error
of the inclusion of restricted deposits. To the extent they were so used
after the panic, currency substitutes should be added to Table A-l, since
unlicensed bank deposits are not included in that table, but not to the
alternative estimates in Table 15 or Chart 34, since these include un-
licensed bank deposits. To the extent currency substitutes came into use
to replace deposits in failed banks and the reduction of deposits in open
banks, i.e., to enable the public to raise the ratio of currency to deposits,
both Table A-l and Table 15 should include them. There seems no
way now, however, of estimating the changing amounts of these cur-
rency substitutes in 1932 and 1933.
Finally, we note two minor defects in the series in Table A-l: the
figures exclude unrestricted deposits in unlicensed banks; the figures
for commercial bank deposits are probably too low for February 1933
and too high for March 1933.
1
0
None of the several experiments we have made to take these various
defects into account has been sufficiently illuminating to add much to the
simple statement that an "ideal" estimate would be somewhere between
the two curves in Chart 34. Almost any such intermediate curve which
is plausible, in the sense that it is consistent with our qualitative knowl-
edge of other defects and also divides the space between the two limits in
proportions that do not vary erratically from month to month, implies
that economic recovery in the half-year after the panic owed nothing to
monetary expansion; the apparent rise in the stock of money is simply a
statistical fiction. The emergency revival of the banking system con-
tributed to recovery by restoring confidence in the monetary and eco-
nomic system and thereby inducing the public to reduce money balances
"See Chap. 7, footnote 32.
1
0 For the information available on the amount of unrestricted deposits in un-
licensed banks, see footnote 6 above.
As to the second defect, the reason is that no published figures are available
between the middle of Feb. and the middle of Apr. for the interpolators used to
estimate nonmember bank deposits between call dates. End-of-Feb. and end-of-
Mar. interpolators were obtained along a straight line between the Feb. and Apr.
figures for the interpolators. This problem does not arise with the monthly member
bank figures, since the gaps in this series were filled on the basis of weekly report-
ing member bank figures which are available throughout for Wednesdays nearest
the end of the month. See our forthcoming companion volume, "Trends and Cycles
in the Stock of Money in the United States, 1867-1960," a National Bureau study.NEW DEAL CHANGES 17
relative to income (to raise velocity) rather than by producing a growth
in the stock of money.
REFORM MEASURES AFFECTING THE BANKING STRUCTURE
Federal Insurance of Bank Deposits
Federal insurance of bank deposits was the most important structural
change in the banking system to result from the 1933 panic, and, indeed
in our view, the structural change most conducive to monetary stability
since state bank note issues were taxed out of existence immediately after
the Civil War. Individual states had experimented with systems of deposit
insurance and numerous proposals for federal deposit insurance had been
introduced into the U.S. Congress over many years. A bill providing for
deposit insurance was passed by the House of Representatives in 1932
under the sponsorship of Representative Henry B Steagall, chairman of
the House Banking and Currency Committee, but killed in the Senate
because of intense opposition by Senator Carter Glass, an influential
member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. Glass favored
merely a liquidating corporation to advance to depositors in failed banks
the estimated amount of their ultimate recovery. In 1933, Steagall and
Glass agreed to combine the two proposals and incorporate them in the
Banking Act of 1933. The resulting section of the act provided for a
permanent deposit insurance plan with very extensive coverage to be-
come effective July 1, 1934.
1
1
It is a nice example of how institutions are developed and shaped that
the actual plan which first became effective on January 1, 1934, resulted
from an amendment to the Banking Act of 1933 introduced by a Senator
from the minority party and at least initially opposed by President
Roosevelt.
1
2 It was opposed also by leading bankers and by some ranking
"FDIC, Annual Report, 1950, pp. 63-67. We have also been greatly helped
by a letter from Clark Warburton, which summarized the detailed origins of
federal deposit insurance. See also Chap. 7, footnote 27, above.
1
2 Jones {Fifty Billion Dollars, pp. 45—46) asserts that President Roosevelt op-
posed deposit insurance and requested Congress to reject the Vandenberg amend-
ment. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, Boston,
Houghton Mifflin, 1959, p. 443; B. N. Timmons, Jesse H. Jones, New York, Holt,
1956, pp. 184, 195.
Carter H. Golembe comments:
... it was the only important piece of legislation during the New Deal's
famous 'one hundred days' which was neither requested nor supported by the
new administration.
Deposit insurance was purely a creature of Congress. For almost fifty years
members had been attempting to secure legislation to this end, without success;
while in individual states the record of experimentation with bank-obligation
insurance systems dated back more than a century. The adoption of nation-wide
deposit insurance in 1933 was made possible by the times, by the perseverance18 NEW DEAL CHANGES
individuals in the Federal Reserve System.
1
3 The amendment, introduced
by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, provided for a temporary system of de-
posit insurance, pending the adoption on July 1, 1934, of the permanent
system. The period of operation of the temporary plan was extended to
July 1, 1935, by an amendment in 1934 and to August 31, 1935, by a
Congressional resolution signed by the President. On August 23, 1935, a
permanent system in roughly its present form became effective under the
provisions of Title I of the Banking Act of 1935.
The Banking Act of 1933 neither abolished nor reduced the powers of
any existing government body concerned with banking. It simply super-
imposed an additional agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, whose functions both supplemented and duplicated those of existing
agencies. Under the terms of the act, all banks that were members of the
Federal Reserve System were required to have their deposits insured by
the FDIC; nonmember banks could be admitted to insurance upon ap-
plication to and approval by the Corporation. Insurance was initially
(January 1, 1934) limited to a maximum of $2,500 of deposits for each
depositor; the limit was raised to $5,000 on July 1, 1934, and to $10,000
on September 21, 1950.
1
4 Insured banks were required in return to pay
of the Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency [Henry B.
Steagall], and by the fact that the legislation attracted support from two groups
which formerly had divergent aims and interests—those who were determined
to end destruction of circulating medium due to bank failures and those who
sought to preserve the existing banking structure ("The Deposit Insurance
Legislation of 1933," Political Science Quarterly, June I960, pp. 181-182).
1
3 Golembe, "Deposit Insurance Legislation," p. 198, footnote 23. At meetings
of the board of directors of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in 1933, strong
opposition to deposit insurance was expressed by Harrison, Eugene Black, then
governor of the Federal Reserve Board, and members of the New York board.
The chief alternative proposed was RFC loans under liberalized lending authority,
possibly combined with Federal Reserve loans to member banks under sect. 10(b),
the Reserve System to be guaranteed against loss on such loans by the federal
government. Also proposed was a relaxation of requirements for membership by
banks in the Reserve System. The alternative makes clear that opposition was not
so much to the assumption by government of ultimate responsibility for deposits as
to the by-passing of the Reserve System and the establishment of a potential
competitor (George L. Harrison Papers on the Federal Reserve System, Columbia
University Library, Harrison, Notes, Vol. Ill, Apr. 10, May 25, June 1, 1933,
pp. 153-156, 197-200, 205-206; for a full description of the Papers, see Chap. 5,
footnote 41 and the accompanying text).
1
1 Despite the impression conveyed by these limits, protection of the circulating
medium rather than protection of the small depositor against loss was the over-
riding concern of the legislators in establishing deposit insurance, as in earlier
attempts to introduce it. In support of this contention, Golembe cites the fact
that "under the original insurance plan, slated to go into operation on June 30,
1934, insurance coverage was to apply to all types of deposit accounts, with maxi-
mum limits for each depositor which were fairly generous .... Only in the
temporary plan, designed to operate for six months, was coverage restricted to
$2,500 for each depositor. However, the original plan never did go into effect.
After several extensions of the temporary plan, during the course of which coverageNEW DEAL CHANGES 19
premiums calculated as a percentage of their deposits
1
5 and, if not mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System, to submit to examination by the
FDIG. The Corporation had the right to examine national and state
member banks only if it obtained the written consent either of the
Comptroller of the Currency or of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. In 1950, however, the FDIC was empowered to make
special examinations of member banks at its own discretion. Member
banks are therefore in principle subject to examination by three agencies:
the Federal Reserve System; the Comptroller of the Currency, if national
banks, or their state banking commissions, if state banks; and the FDIC.
Nonmember insured banks may be examined by two agencies: their state
banking commissions and the FDIC. In practice, of course, agreements




Insurance first became effective on January 1, 1934. Within six months,
nearly 14,000 of the nation's 15,348 commercial banks, accounting for
was raised to $5,000 for each depositor ... it was found that this provided full
coverage for more than 98 per cent of the depositors." Moreover, FDIC proce-
dures in helping a distressed insured bank, which have the effect of protecting
all deposits, and the immediate payment of insured deposits rather than payment
over time in the form of receivers' dividends, suggest that protection of the cir-
culating medium from the consequences of bank failures was the primary function
of deposit insurance (Golembe, "The Deposit Insurance Legislation," pp. 193—
194).
1
8 The premium for members of the Temporary Deposit Insurance Fund was %
of 1 per cent of deposits eligible for insurance. Only one-half the premium was
ever paid, and part of that half which was unused at the close of the temporary
fund was returned to the banks. Under the permanent system, the premium was
changed to M2 of 1 per cent of total deposits, payable semiannually. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Act of Sept. 21, 1950, again changed the base for deposit in-
surance assessment. Each semiannual assessment computation is now based on the
average of reports on two dates instead of the daily average for the six-months'
period; also, in determining the assessment base, other items besides cash items
are deductible from deposits. In addition, the act provided that three-fifths of the
premium payments by insured banks in excess of the Corporation's operating ex-
penses, losses, and additions to the insurance fund to cover anticipated losses dur-
ing the calendar year are to be credited pro rata to the banks to be applied in the
following year as part payment for premiums which become due in that year. An
amendment, dated July 14, 1960, raised the fraction to two-thirds.
w In addition numerous clearing house associations also exercise a degree of
supervision over their member banks. The variety of supervisory agreements has
been a perennial source of concern to the supervising bodies themselves, and one
of their important activities has been coordination of examination and standards
(see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1938, pp.
11-18; and FDIC, Annual Report, 1938, pp. 61-79). See also Clark Warburton,
"Co-ordination of Monetary, Bank Supervisory, and Loan Agencies of the Federal
Government," Journal of Finance, June 1950, pp. 161-166. Warburton argues,
correctly in our view, that the Board of Governors should be relieved of such
duties as the regular examination of member banks, which should be concentrated
in the agencies concerned with the affairs of individual banks, such as the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the state banking commissions, and the FDIC.20 NEW DEAL CHANGES
some 97 per cent of all commercial bank deposits, were covered by in-
surance. The number of uninsured commercial banks has since declined to
under 400, and their deposits now amount to less than 1 per cent of total
deposits in all commercial banks. Mutual savings banks, which were also
eligible for insurance, found it much less attractive. In mid-1934 only
66 out of 565 banks, accounting for only a bit over one-tenth of all
mutual savings deposits, were insured. The coverage of mutual savings
banks rose slowly until World War II, then accelerated, so that by the
end of 1945, 192 out of 542 banks accounting for two-thirds of all de-
posits were insured, and by the end of 1960, 325 out of 515 accounting
for 87 per cent of all deposits.
1
7
Federal deposit insurance has been accompanied by a dramatic change
in commercial bank failures and in losses borne by depositors in banks
that fail (Table 16). From 1921 through 1933, every year requires at
least three digits to record the number of banks that suspended; from
1934 on, two digits suffice, and from 1943 through 1960, one digit, for
both insured and noninsured banks. For the thirteen-year period 1921 to
1933, losses borne by depositors averaged $146 million a year or 45 cents
per $100 of adjusted deposits in all commercial banks. For the twenty-seven
years since, losses have averaged $706,000 a year, or less than two-tenths
of 1 cent per $100 of adjusted deposits in all commercial banks; moreover,
over half the total losses during the twenty-seven years occurred in the
very first year of the period and were mostly a heritage of the pre-FDIC
period.
Technically, only deposits not exceeding a specified sum (since 1950,
$10,000) are insured. In 1960, insured deposits amounted to only 57
per cent of all deposits of insured banks. In practice, however, the near-
absence of bank failures recorded in Table 16 means that all deposits are
effectively insured. The reduction in failures is not of course attributable
to any correspondingly drastic improvement in the quality of bank officials
or in the effectiveness of the supervisory authorities; nor is it attributable
to the addition of still another examination agency, though the addition
1
7 The wartime increase is attributable to the admission to membership of 125
New York State mutual savings banks on July 1, 1943. They and others had
withdrawn from the temporary deposit insurance plan in June 1934. They wanted
a premium rate that recognized the lower factor of risk in insuring savings banks
and, in addition, believed that the savings banks' own insurance agency could
safeguard depositors better than any national agency. In New York the mutual
savings banks created their own insurance fund on July 1, 1934. Mutual savings
banks in two New England states also organized statewide insurance plans. The
New York plan and the arguments for it were abandoned in favor of membership
in the FDIC in 1943. It was then held that in a real emergency statewide protec-
tion would not be strong enough and federal assistance would be required (A. A.
Berle, The Bank that Banks Built: The Story of Savings Banks Trust Company,
1933-1958, New York, Harper, 1959, pp. 65, 71-73). See also FDIC, Annual Re-
port, 1960, pp. 91, 93.TABLE 16
COMMERCIAL BANK SUSPENSIONS, 1921-60
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(1-3) Unpublished estimates, Division of Research and Statistics, FDIG, used with
permission of the Corporation. Number and deposits slightly revised, by FDIC,
from Federal Reserve Bulletin, Sept. 1937, pp. 868, 873. Losses estimated by
FDIC by applying to the deposits the appropriate loss percentages derived from
samples (see FDIC, Annual Report, 1934, pp. 84, 86; 1940, pp. 70-73).
(4) Col. 3 divided by June commercial bank deposits in Table A-l.
PART n
All Commercial Banks
(1-3) Sum of corresponding cols, for insured and noninsured banks.
(4) Col. 3 divided by June commercial bank deposits in Table A-l.
Insured Banks
(1-3) FDIC, Annual Report, 1958, pp. 5, 27-28; 1959, p. 5; 1960, p. 5. The banks
counted are those requiring disbursements by the FDIC. Two mutual savings
(continued)NEW DEAL CHANGES 23
NOTES TO TABLE 16 (concluded)
banks included in the published figures were deducted by us (ibid., 1938, pp.
250, 256, and 1939, p. 216).
Noninsured Banks
(1-3) Unpublished estimates, Division of Research and Statistics, FDIC; for cols.
1 and 2, the estimates are revisions of figures given in FDIC, Annual Report,
1960, p. 181, and sources listed there.
° Deposits of noninsured suspended banks are missing in the following years for the
following numbers of banks: 1938, 1; 1939, 2; 1941, 1; and 1954, 1.
6 Losses borne by depositors for the following numbers of noninsured suspended






























n.a. = not available.
of the FDIC apparently meant closer supervision and examination of
insured state banks. Rather, it reflects, in the main, two other factors.
First, "bad" banks, though perhaps no less frequent than before, are
seldom permitted to fail if they are insured; instead, they are reorganized
under new management or merged with a good bank, with the FDIC
assuming responsibility for losses in connection with depreciated assets.
Second, the knowledge on the part of small depositors that they will be
able to realize on their deposits even if the bank should experience
financial difficulties prevents the failure of one bank from producing
"runs" on other banks that in turn may force "sound" banks to suspend.
Deposit insurance is thus a form of insurance that tends to reduce the
contingency insured against.
Adopted as a result of the widespread losses imposed by bank failures
in the early 1930's, federal deposit insurance, to 1960 at least, has suc-
ceeded in achieving what had been a major objective of banking reform
for at least a century, namely, the prevention of banking panics. Such
panics arose out of or were greatly intensified by a loss of confidence in
the ability of banks to convert deposits into currency and a consequent
desire on the part of the public to increase the fraction of its money held
in the form of currency. The resulting runs on banks could be met in a
fractional reserve system only if confidence were restored at an early24 NEW DEAL CHANGES
stage. Otherwise, they inevitably brought restriction of convertibility of
deposits into currency.
As we have seen, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act and then the Federal Re-
serve System were both attempts to solve this problem by enabling banks
to convert their assets into additional high-powered money for use in
meeting the demands of their depositors for currency. The aim was to
make it possible for runs or their equivalent, once begun, to be met with-
out forcing banks either to suspend business individually or, by concerted
action, to restrict the conversion of deposits into currency. The Aldrich-
Vreeland Act succeeded on the one occasion it was used, the outbreak of
World War I. The Federal Reserve System failed in the early 1930's
though, as we have seen, proper use of its powers could have averted
the panic. As these powers were in fact used, however, the existence of
the System served only to postpone repeatedly the final crisis, which, when
it finally came, was more severe and far-reaching than any earlier panic.
Federal deposit insurance attempts to solve the problem by removing
the initial reason for runs—loss of confidence in the ability to convert
deposits into currency. While there have been substantial changes since
1934 in the ratio of currency to deposits (see Chapters 9 to 11 below),
there have been no radical changes in short periods like those before 1934,
always the invariable hallmark of a liquidity crisis and a banking panic.
And it is hard to believe that any are likely to occur in the foreseeable
future.
True, if for any reason there should be a substantial and long-continued
decline in the stock of money, such as occurred from 1929 to 1933, the
effects on the value of bank assets would very likely cause so many banks
to become insolvent as to exhaust existing reserve funds of the FDIC.
However, the greater part of the 1929-33 decline in the stock of money
was not independent of the initial bank failures. It was rather a con-
sequence of them, because of their effect on the deposit-currency ratio
and the failure of the Reserve System to offset the fall in the ratio by
a sufficient increase in high-powered money. Had federal deposit in-
surance been in existence in 1930, it would very likely have prevented the
initial fall in the deposit-currency ratio in late 1930 and hence the
tragic sequence of events that fall set in train, including the drastic
decline in the money stock. It may be that, today, a radical change in
the deposit-currency ratio would evoke a different and more suitable
response from the monetary authorities, so that, even in the absence of
federal deposit insurance, a banking panic, once begun, would not be
permitted to cumulate. The existence of federal deposit insurance greatly
reduces, if it does not eliminate, the need to rely on such a response.
As we have seen in earlier chapters, banking panics have occurred only
during severe contractions and have greatly intensified such contractions,NEW DEAL CHANGES 25
if indeed they have not been the primary factor converting what would
otherwise have been mild contractions into severe ones. That is why we
regard federal deposit insurance as so important a change in our banking
structure and as contributing so greatly to monetary stability-—in practice




The other changes in the commercial and savings banking structure
during the New Deal period are much less far reaching than the estab-
lishment of deposit insurance and can be noted summarily.
Conditions of membership in the Federal Reserve System were modified
to make permissible the admission of Morris Plan and mutual savings
banks. Rules governing the establishment of branch banks were somewhat
liberalized, and double liability on stock of national banks was eliminated.
Investment affiliates of commercial banks were prohibited, and inter-
locking directorates between commercial banks and investment companies
restricted.
National bank notes were converted into a Treasury obligation and
arrangements made to retire them from circulation. The provision for
issuing them terminated on August 1, 1935, with the redemption of the
two remaining issues of U.S. bonds bearing the circulation privilege.
1
9
The volume in circulation had declined to $650 million by August 1935.
It has been declining steadily ever since; even so, at the end of 1960,




8 See Milton Friedman, "Why the American Economy is Depression-Proof,"
Nationalekonomiska Foreningens, sammantrade den 28 April 1954, pp. 59-60. To
avoid misunderstanding, we should note explicitly that deposit insurance is but one
of several ways in which a panic-proof banking system could have been achieved.
Our comments are not intended to suggest that some other method might not
have been preferable to deposit insurance. For an alternative method, see
Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, New York, Fordham University Press,
1960, pp. 65-76.
1
9 Each national bank transferred to the Treasury the liability for its circulating
notes by depositing enough funds with it over and above the 5 per cent redemption
fund already held by the Treasury to cover its notes outstanding. Those deposits
reduced member bank reserves, but the funds disbursed by the Treasury to redeem
the called bonds restored reserves. Since 1935, as national bank notes have returned
from circulation, Federal Reserve Banks have shipped them to the Treasury for
retirement. Payment for these notes is made to the Federal Reserve Banks by a
charge against the Treasury's account. The Treasury replenishes its account by
depositing with the Reserve Banks gold certificate credits which it set aside for
this purpose, drawn from part of the profit accruing to the government upon
the devaluation of the dollar (see footnote 53, below).
2
0 This sum includes the amount that has been lost or destroyed as well as notes
that are in numismatic collections and notes that are still in use as currency. To
judge from the rate at which the sum outstanding has been declining, it seems
likely that perhaps half the sum outstanding will sooner or later be offered for
retirement. If we ignore amounts held in numismatic collections, this implies that26 NEW DEAL CHANGES
Banks were prohibited by law or regulation from paying interest on
demand deposits and from paying rates of interest on time deposits
higher than those specified by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for member banks and by the FDIC for insured non-
member banks. Member banks were also prohibited from .acting as agents




Throughout American banking history, the view has recurrently been
expressed that payment of interest on deposits led to "excessive" competi-
tion among banks, and "forced" them to reduce reserves to an undesirably
low level and to engage in unduly risky investment and lending policies
because of the necessity of earning income to pay the interest. The sug-
gestion had frequently been made that the payment of interest be pro-
hibited.
2
2 The prohibition was finally adopted for demand deposits in
something like $30 million of national bank notes has been lost or destroyed.
Though large in absolute amount, the annual rate of loss implied is rather small.
For the 97 years from 1864 through 1960, the average amount of national bank
notes in circulation was $369 million. The conjectured sum lost or destroyed is
roughly 10 per cent of this average or roughly one-tenth of 1 per cent per year.
These estimates imply that paper currency is lost or destroyed at the rate of $1
per year for each $1,000.
2
1 In addition, the Banking Act of 1933 made member banks subject to severe
reprisal for undue use of bank credit "for the speculative carrying of or trading in
securities, real estate, or commodities, or for any other purposes inconsistent with
the maintenance of sound credit conditions." The Reserve Banks were authorized
to suspend uncooperative banks "from the use of the credit facilities of the Federal
Reserve System." The Federal Reserve Board was authorized to fix for each
district "the percentage of individual bank capital and surplus which may be
represented by loans secured by stock or bond collateral." If, despite an official
warning to curtail them, such loans by member banks were increased, Reserve
Bank 90-day advances to the offending banks on their own notes became due
immediately, and the banks might be suspended from rediscount privileges.
2
3 L. W. Mints, A History of Banking Theory, University of Chicago Press, 1945,
pp. 141, 185, 209, 234-235. The suggestion predated the establishment of the
Federal Reserve System—when there was no general distinction between demand
and time deposits—and the arguments advanced related particularly to payment
of interest on bankers' balances which were, for the most part at least, with-
drawable on demand. In 1933, during the discussions leading to the Banking Act
of 1933, the arguments were restated against demand deposits generally, whether
or not they were bankers' balances. A quotation from O. M. W. Sprague (History
of Crises Under the National Banking System, National Monetary Commission,
1910, p. 21) provides a good summary of the general stand against payment of
interest on deposits:
The interest-paying banks were unable to maintain large reserves and at the
same time realize a profit from the use of the funds thus attracted. Particularly
was this the case when the accumulation of such funds was only temporary. The
extra supply of money to be lent forced down rates, and, as rates fell, more and
more had to be lent by the banks in order even to equal the interest which they
had contracted to pay.
The argument is of course a standard one made by private groups seeking
"cartel" powers: e.g., one of the arguments used in the 1930's in justifying controlNEW DEAL CHANGES 27
member banks—in the Banking Act of 1933—and for demand deposits in
other insured banks—in the Banking Act of 1935—partly because of the
greater willingness after 1933 to legislate with respect to economic matters,
partly because of the view—in our opinion, largely erroneous—that the
banking difficulties of the early 1930's derived in considerable measure
from the stock market boom and the participation of banks in the boom
as direct lenders and as agents for others.
2
3
One consequence of the prohibition of payment of interest on demand
deposits has been a marked decline in the importance of interbank de-
posits—the demand deposits on which the payment of interest had been
most widespread and at the highest rates. For member banks, balances at
domestic banks were 76 per cent of deposits at Federal Reserve Banks at
the end of 1933. They had fallen to 49 per cent by the end of 1937 and
to 28 per cent by 1948. They have since risen to about 50 per cent.
Beyond this, the prohibition had no great effect until recent years. The
over entry into medicine was that physicians whose incomes were "unduly" low
would be driven to engage in "unethical" practices. See, for example, A. D. Bevain,
"The Overcrowding of the Medical Profession," Journal of the Association of
Medical Colleges, Nov. 1936, pp. 377-384; and Milton Friedman and Simon
Kuznets, Income from Independent Professional Practice, New York, NBER, 1945,
p. 12 and references there cited in footnote 18.
The payment or nonpayment of interest on demand deposits does not
alter in any way the incentive to use assets so as to yield the largest return,
as judged by the banker, where return is defined to include nonmonetary
as well as monetary elements. The prohibition of payment of interest is
simply a government enforced price-fixing agreement. If the prohibition were
effective, if it initially increased returns to existing banks, and if entry into the
banking industry were free, the effects would be the usual open cartel effects: more
banks than would otherwise exist, each operating at partial capacity and competing
away the initial extra returns until the returns to skill and capital invested in
banking were the same as in other fields. Since entry is not free, thanks to the
need to get a franchise from a government authority, the results would likely be
intermediate between those just described and the results to be expected if entry
were prohibited entirely: a higher market value of the stock of banks, and roughly
the competitive return to skill and per dollar of market value of capital.
Of course, all this assumes that the prohibition is not evaded as, of course, it
can be at least partly by altering the amount of services given to depositors.
2
8 After the prohibition of the payment of interest on demand deposits was in
effect, another reason favoring the prohibition was discovered. Under the temporary
deposit insurance plan, banks were assessed on insured deposits only; under the
proposed permanent plan, on total deposits. City banks complained that under the
permanent plan, their assessments would subsidize small country banks, since total
deposits of city banks were considerably larger than their insured deposits while
total deposits of country banks were not much more than their insured deposits.
It was then noted that the reduction in expenses as a result of the prohibition of
the payment of interest on demand deposits—expenses mainly borne by city banks
—served as an offset to their assessments for deposit insurance (Banking Act of
1935, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. 1715, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 1935, part 1, pp. 29-30; part 2, pp.
433, 490-492).28 NEW DEAL CHANGES
rate of earnings on bank assets was so low during the 1930's and 1940's
that banks were led to impose service charges on depositors, that is, the
rate of interest on demand deposits was essentially negative, so that the
fixed price for demand deposits was, as it were, above the market price
for demand deposits. Competition has taken the form of changes in these
service charges and of the provision of special services to depositors.
The limitation of rates of interest paid on time deposits,
2
4 though
initially welcomed by commercial banks, has more recently been a
hindrance to them in the competition for these deposits with alternative
institutions, particularly savings banks and savings and loan associations,
which pay higher rates (see Chapter 12). These rates, too, have for much
of the time been ineffective. Discontinuous changes in them after they
have become effective have produced sizable perturbations in the rate of
change of commercial bank time deposits.
The reduction in interbank deposits plus the prohibition of banks'
acting as agents of nonbank lenders in placing funds on the stock market
contributed to the sharp decline in security loans by banks and the dwin-
dling in importance of the call-loan market as a means of investing
secondary reserves.
CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM
The Banking Act of 1935 changed the name of the Federal Reserve Board
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; reconstituted
the Board by eliminating ex officio members; raised the salaries and
lengthened the terms of the Board members; and reorganized the Federal
Open Market Committee to consist of the seven members of the Board
plus five representatives of the Federal Reserve Banks, instead of the




4 Regulation Q of the Board of Governors regulating interest rates on time
deposits provides that where state banking authorities have fixed maximum interest
rates payable on time deposits at figures lower than those set by the Board of
Governors, the lower state figures become the maximum which can be paid by
member banks located in those states.
8
5 The change in name was the final seal on the transfer of effective power from
the Banks to the Board. Heretofore, the chief executive officers of the Banks had
been governors, the title generally assigned to the operative head of central banks.
Only the executive head of the Board had also been a governor and addressed as
such. The other members were simply members of the Board and were addressed
without title. Henceforth, the members of the Board were governors in formal title
as in fact and the executive heads of the Banks were presidents.
According to Marriner Eccles, it was at Senator Glass' insistence that the
Secretary of the Treasury as an ex officio member was dropped: " 'When I was
Secretary of Treasury,' Glass said, ... 'I had considerable influence with the
action of the Board, and I ... have suspected . . . that frequently since the
Secretary of the Treasury had too much influence upon the Board, and I do notNEW DEAL CHANGES 29
tion, it completed a step begun in the Banking Act of 1933 by eliminating
the power of Banks to buy and sell government securities for their own
account except with the explicit permission or at the direction of the
Federal Open Market Committee.
2
6 These measures recognized and
think he ought to be there' " (Beckoning Frontiers, New York, Knopf, 1951, p.
216 n.). Eccles says Senator Glass had no objection to the ex officio membership
of the Comptroller of the Currency, but Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
was piqued that a subordinate in his department and not he would serve on the
Board so, to mollify him, the Comptroller was also dropped. As we shall see in
Chapters 10 and 11 and as we saw in Chapter 5, the Treasury does not need actual
representation on the Board of Governors to exercise considerable influence upon its
actions.
The chief executive officer of each Federal Reserve Bank was designated for the
first time in the Banking Act of 1935 as the president, formerly called governor,
rather than the chairman of the board of directors who is also known as the
Federal Reserve agent. The election of each Bank's president and first vice-
president by the board of directors is subject to the approval of the Board of
Governors. Since 1942, the five representatives of the Reserve Banks chosen
annually to serve on the Federal Open Market Committee must be either Reserve
Bank presidents or vice-presidents. The role of the Federal Reserve agents, who
supervise the issue of Federal Reserve notes, has been greatly reduced since
the Banking Act of 1935.
MThe regulations governing the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) —
organized under the Banking Act of 1933 and composed of all the Reserve Bank
governors—gave the Banks permission to purchase government securities for their
own account, subject to certain restrictions, in an emergency involving individual
banking institutions (Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report for 1933, p. 302).
Harrison tried but failed to persuade the FOMC organized under the Banking
Act of 1935 to adopt a similar provision. On the first vote, his motion was passed
6 to' 5, with all the Bank presidents and one member of the Board voting in favor
(there were only six Board members at the time; a seven-man Board was not
appointed until 1955). The motion finally lost by a tie vote, for the Board member
changed his vote on the ground that the motion—which he still favored—ought
not prevail without a larger affirmative margin (Harrison, Miscellaneous, Vol. IV,
letter, dated Jan. 19, 1937, Harrison to Eccles; also Harrison, Open Market* Vol.
IV, minutes of meeting, Jan. 26, 1937).
The by-laws of the FOMC under tlje Banking Act of 1935 also provided that
members representing Banks did not serve as representatives of the particular
Banks that elected them nor were they to be instructed by those Banks. Eccles said
that "the open market committee should be composed entirely as a public body
and . . . the banks should participate only through an advisory committee, the
banks not knowing what was to be done but having a chance to be heard through
a committee" (Harrison, Notes, Vol. VII, July 16, 1936; also Vol. VII, Mar. 5,
1936).
Presidents of Banks serving on the FOMC were prohibited by its by-laws from
divulging to their directors actions taken at a FOMC meeting. Eccles said that "it
would not be proper for directors of the Federal reserve banks affiliated with
organizations owning Government securities to have any information which might
benefit the organization with which they are associated" (ibid., Vol. VII, July 16,
1936). He disclaimed the idea that any of the directors would take advantage of
their situation, but "there is a good deal of talk in Congress about just that sort
of thing." Harrison deplored the "throttling of officers and directors of reserve
banks by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System" (ibid., Nov. 12,
1936).30 NEW DEAL CHANGES
consolidated the trend of power within the System away from the Federal
Reserve Banks and toward Washington. In the same direction was the
provision requiring the Board and the Federal Open Market Committee
to keep and publish a complete record of all actions taken and of the
considerations underlying the actions.
The broadening of the powers of the System was of greater significance
than the change in its structure. The Board and the Banks naturally
attributed the System's failure to stem the 1929-33 contraction and to
prevent the banking panic to its inadequate powers rather than to the
use it made of the powers it had. It both requested additional powers and
was urged to accept them. The first measure along these lines preceded
the panic: the Glass-Steagall Act, discussed earlier, which broadened
acceptable collateral for Federal Reserve notes and permitted emergency
advances to member banks on any asset. Other provisions of the Banking
Act of 1935, all extending the System's powers, are:
(1) Enlargement of the Board's power to alter reserve requirements.
First granted in 1933 by the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1933 as an emergency power to be exercised only with
permission of the President, the emergency power was replaced by a
permanent grant of authority, not dependent on Presidential permission,
to change reserve requirements between the minimum percentages speci-
fied in the act of June 1917 and twice those percentages.
2
7 A further
change in reserve requirements prescribed reserves against government
deposits. Country banks, in particular, benefited by a provision permitting
"due from" items to be deducted from gross demand deposits instead of
solely from "due to" items.
(2) Broadening of the lending powers of the Banks. The section of the
Glass-Steagall Act which had allowed emergency advances was liberalized
and made permanent. It authorized a Reserve Bank to make advances to
" In Aug. 1948 Congress granted th» Board temporary power, terminating
June 30, 1949, to raise the maximum percentages permitted under the Banking
Act of 1935 by 4 points on demand deposits, by 1% points on time deposits.
In July 1959 the Board was authorized to treat vault cash as part of a member
bank's reserves. In Dec. 1959 central reserve and reserve city banks with vault cash
holdings greater than 2 per cent of their demand deposits and country banks with
vault cash holdings greater than 4 per cent of their demand deposits were given
permission to count the excess as reserves. Effective Aug. 25, 1960, the percentage
was changed to 2% per cent for country banks and, effective Sept. 1, 1960, to 1
per cent for reserve city and central reserve city banks. Since Nov. 1960 all vault
cash has been counted as part of a member bank's reserves.
Under the law passed in July 1959, the Board was also required to eliminate
the central reserve city classification within three years. By Dec. 1, 1960, there
was no longer any differential between central reserve and reserve city reserve
requirements, and the central reserve city classification that had come into existence
nearly a hundred years earlier passed into history.
The Board's authority to allow individual banks in central reserve and reserve
cities to carry lower reserves was also broadened in July 1959.NEW DEAL CHANGES 31
its member banks on any satisfactory security whenever desired, subject
only to the rules of the Board. The theory of eligibility as the basis for
Federal Reserve credit was thus laid to rest.
(3) Empowering the Board to set a maximum limit to interest rates
paid by member banks on time deposits. Granted by the Banking Act of
1933, that power was reaffirmed by the Banking Act of 1935 which gave
the same power to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with regard
to insured nonmember banks.
(4) Granting of power to the Board to regulate credit advanced by
bankers and brokers to their customers for purchasing and carrying
registered securities. With this power, granted by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the Board has since set margin requirements for loans
granted by member and nonmember banks on stocks (Regulation U),
and by members of national security exchanges on stocks and bonds
(Regulation T).
2
8 This grant of power was the final outcome of the
concern of the Board with stock market speculation in the late twenties
and of its attempt to use "direct pressure" to discriminate between stock
market and other uses of credit. It was the precursor of other powers
directed at the control of particular uses of credit—in particular, con-
trol over credit extended for the purchase of consumer goods and for real
estate construction, both of which proved to be temporary powers. We
shall have occasion to refer to credit controls later (see below, Chapters
9 and 10).
The additional powers, like the powers already possessed by the System,
can be divided into three categories: those whose main role is to enable
the Board to control the quantity of money—we may call these the instru-
ments of monetary policy; those whose main role is to enable the Board
to control the price and use of credit—we may call these the instruments
of credit policy;
2
9 and those whose main role is to enable the Board to
supervise the operations of banks—-we may call these the instru-
ments of bank supervision. Of course, as our use of the word "main"
suggests, there is no hard and fast line between them, and each power may
have effects on the quantity of money, the price and use of credit, and the
operations of banks. Open market operations and rediscounting were the
2
8 Originally margin requirements were applied only against "long" security
transactions. On Nov. 1, 1937, the Board included short sales within the scope
of margin regulation, with margin for short sales set at 50 per cent, for long
reduced from 55 to 40 per cent. Since the war, margin requirements have been
uniform for both long and short sales. Up to Apr. 1, 1936, variable percentage
margins were set, the margin requirement rising within limits set with each in-
crease in the price of the security. Since then, margin requirements have been a
fixed percentage of the price.
2
9 Warburton refers to the same distinction, terming it one between "monetary
control" and "loan control" (see "Monetary Control under the Federal Reserve
Act," Political Science Quarterly, Dec. 1946, pp. 513-516).32 NEW DEAL CHANGES
chief initial monetary powers; the banking measures under consideration
added power to vary reserve requirements. Eligibility requirements were
the chief initial credit powers; the powers added in this class included
control of security credit and, for a time later on, consumer and real
estate credit; in addition, the granting of authority to Reserve Banks to
make advances to member banks on any satisfactory security rendered
the initial eligibility requirements largely irrelevant. Bank examination,
requirements for admission to the Federal Reserve System, and, in terms
of initial views about their role, reserve requirements were the chief
initial supervisory powers; the added powers included control over
interest rates on time deposits, control over the percentage of bank
capital and surplus that could be represented by security loans, and the
policing of the prohibition of the payment of interest on demand deposits.
POLICIES OF BANKS
The banks that survived the holocaust of the early thirties probably
differed from those that went under. In addition, and very likely much
more important, they undoubtedly drew from the experience lessons that
affected their future behavior. For both reasons, the banks that survived
understandably placed far greater weight on liquidity than the banks in
existence in 1929.
The pressure for liquidity is, as we shall see, the best explanation
for two notable changes in the composition of bank assets. The changes
are: first, a sharp rise in the fraction held in the form of cash assets (cash
in vault, items in process of collection, and balances at other banks in-
cluding Reserve Banks), a change commented on earlier (Chapter 7,
section 2) in connection with the emergence of "excess" reserves in 1932;
second, a sharp rise in investments relative to loans.
In 1929, cash assets amounted to 14 per cent of total assets, and loans
were more than two and one-half times investments (Table 17). By
mid-1933, cash assets had risen to 18 per cent of total assets along with
a shrinkage of more than one-third in total assets, and there is little doubt
that only the frozen condition of banks prevented the percentage from
being still higher. At the same time loans were only slightly larger than
investments. Moreover, the investments had shifted in composition, from
less than 40 per cent in the form of U.S. government securities in 1929 to
over 50 per cent in 1933
3
0 and, judging from member bank data, from
nearly three-quarters of U.S. securities in the form of bonds, generally
longer term, to only a bit over one-half in this form (Table 18). Those
moves were all in the direction of increasing the fraction of its assets that
an individual bank could convert into cash at short notice and with small
capital loss—these were properties of its assets whose importance had been
3
0 All-Bank Statistics, p. 35.NEW DEAL CHANGES 33
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dNEW DEAL CHANGES 35
impressed on commercial bankers by the experiences of the preceding few
years.
As total assets increased sharply after 1933, bankers took the oppor-
tunity offered by the increase to strengthen their cash position and
to expand investments, and among them, governments, more rapidly than
loans. By 1940, cash assets had mounted to 36 per cent of total assets
(Table 17). Loans were only about 70 per cent of investments and about
70 per cent of investments were in the form of U.S. government securities.
Unfortunately, there are no adequate data on the maturity distribution
of bank investments. Beginning in late 1928, data are available on the
distribution of government security holdings of all member banks among
three categories: bills and certificates of indebtedness; notes; and bonds
(see Table 18). The first category had a maturity of less than one year
when issued, the second, of one to five years, and the third, of more
than five years. However, depending on the particular security, the re-
maining maturity, when purchased or held, might be quite different
from the original maturity. A bond, for example, might have a remaining
maturity when purchased or held of less than a year and so be comparable
in maturity to bills. In consequence, the distribution of security holdings
among the indicated categories is at best a very rough index of their
distribution by maturity.
The data show a decided shift in the composition of the security hold-
ings of banks after 1928 and 1929. In 1928, 1929, and 1930, bonds con-
stituted about 70 to 80 per cent of the total of U.S. securities held by
member banks, the balance being distributed somewhat more in notes than
in bills and certificates. In 1931 and 1932, bonds remained about 75 per
cent of the total, but about two-thirds of the remainder was in the form
of bills and certificates and one-third in notes, suggesting that under the
pressure of successive liquidity crises banks shifted into shorter-term
securities. After 1932, the fraction in the form of bonds fell steadily to
54 and 53 per cent in June of 1933 and 1934, 45 per cent in June of 1935
and 1936. True, after 1932, notes rose sharply relative to bills and certifi-
cates, from one-third of the three combined in 1932 to two-thirds in 1933
and 1934 and to four-fifths in 1935 and 1936. However, that shift was
largely a result of a limited supply of bills and certificates. Member
banks held close to 50 per cent of the bills and certificates outside the
Federal Reserve Banks from 1931 to 1933, and around 70 per cent from
1934 to 1936. They held roughly 50 per cent of the notes from 1932 to
1936 and around one-third of the bonds. By contrast, in 1928 banks held
about 30 per cent each of the bills and certificates and of the notes outside
the Federal Reserve System and about a quarter of the bonds. The banks
had absorbed so much larger a fraction of the bills, certificates, and notes36 NEW DEAL CHANGES
outside the Federal Reserve System than of the bonds that banks had be-
come the dominant factor in the market for these short-term obligations.
No doubt changes in the demand for loans and in the supply of in-
vestments, and the large increase in available reserves produced by the
gold inflows—all of which constituted changes in the supply of assets for
banks to hold—played a role in the shifts in asset composition. However,
the major factor was not those but rather a shift in the liquidity prefer-
ences of commercial banks, that is, a change in the demand by banks for
assets, which is to say, in the portfolio composition they sought to attain
for any given structure of yields. The inflow of gold—the most dramatic
force operating on the supply side—in the first instance increased the
cash assets of the banking system. But the banks were individually free
to convert the additional assets into other forms, and collectively of
course that conversion would have been and was reflected in a rise in
the stock of money and in the total assets of banks. Such reactions on the
part of banks could therefore have offset in full, as they did in part,
the effect of the gold inflow on the ratio of cash assets to total assets.
There was, of course, some lag in the reactions of banks, and no doubt
the lag made cash assets somewhat larger relative to total assets during
the periods of steady gold inflow than they otherwise would have been.
Such a lag cannot, however, account for the continued increase in the
ratio of cash assets to total assets, since there was no corresponding in-
crease in the rate of gold inflow. Moreover, such a lag cannot explain
the shifting composition of noncash assets.
The behavior of rates of interest is decisive evidence that the shift-
ing composition of noncash assets cannot be explained by changes in
the supply of assets available for banks to hold but only by changes in
liquidity preferences on the part of the banks. Suppose the shifts in bank
portfolios had reflected mainly shifts in supply without a change in the
preferences of banks for different kinds of assets. The assets whose relative
importance in the portfolio increased should then also have been the
ones on which the yield rose in comparison with the yield on other assets,
since the issuers of such assets would have had to raise their yield to in-
duce banks to hold them in increased amount.
3
1 In fact, the structure of
3
1 The wording is deliberately vague about how the yields should be compared,
whether in terms of the ratio of yields or the absolute difference between them
(spread). It is an open question, about which there is no general agreement, which
is the more relevant for judging changes in the relative attractiveness of assets. In
our view, this question cannot be given a single answer; sometimes the one and
sometimes the other will be the more relevant, though on the whole, for our
present purpose, the spread seems preferable. Fortunately, however, for the episode
under discussion, it makes no difference how the question is answered. Except for
cash assets (see footnote 32), the major movements in the spread and in the
relative yield were in the same direction.CHART 35




Basic yield of 40-to-50-year
corporate bonds
Commercial loans, 19 cities
U.S. bonds not due or callable
for 12 years or more
Commercial paper, 4-to-6 month
Bankers' acceptances, 90-day
Short-term U.S. securities
1928 '29 '30 '3t '32 "33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38. '39
SOURCE: Baa and Aaa corporate bonds, commercial loans, bankers' acceptances, Banking and
Monetary Statistics, pp. 448, 464, 468. Commercial loan rate, annual averages; for 1939 based on
Jan.-Feb. only; monthly data unavailable thereafter on a comparable basis. Basic yield of 40- to
50-year corporate bonds, Historical Statistics, I960, p. 657, Series X-347. U.S. government bonds.
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1938, p. 1045; Feb. 1940, p. 139. Commercial paper, Historical
Statistics, 1949, p. 346, averaged annually. Short-term U.S. government securities, FRB, May 1945,
p. 483: 3- to 6-month certificate? and notes, 1928-30; 3- to 9-month Treasury bills, 1931-42.38 NEW DEAL CHANGES
interest rates moved the other way for assets other than cash assets.
3
2
Rates charged on customer loans and yields on long-term government
bonds were low after 1933 by earlier standards, and customer rates had
fallen more than long-term bond yields; however, rates on short-term
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and short-term U.S. securities—
the kinds of assets whose relative importance in bank portfolios had
increased most—were lower still by those standards (see Chart 35).
3
3
Among corporate bonds, yields on lower-grade bonds had fallen decidedly
less from 1929 to 1936 than yields on high-grade bonds had, again
suggesting a shift of preference toward the more certain. The most
notable change in the structure .of rates of return from before to after the
1929-33 contraction was the sharp widening in spread among assets
differing in the degree of confidence the holder could attach to their
convertibility into a known cash sum at need and on short notice. It
follows that the initial supposition that the change in bank portfolios
reflected mainly shifts in the supply of assets is untenable. The change
must have reflected shifts in demand by banks and others for different
kinds of assets.
3
4 Moreover, the change in the distribution of government
3
2 The argument from interest rates alone, which is decisive for other assets, is
not decisive for cash assets. It does not, of course, follow that there was no shift
in preferences for cash assets comparable to that for the other assets that rose in
relative importance in bank portfolios. On the contrary, we argue below that there
was such a shift, and that it reinforced a change in conditions of supply to produce
a much larger rise in the relative importance of cash assets in bank portfolios than
would otherwise have occurred.
For the cash assets of Table 17, the yield fell from a minor positive amount,
because of interest paid on interbank balances, to zero. The ratio of the yield on
other assets to the yield on cash assets therefore rose from a finite amount to in-
finity. However, the spread between other yields and the yield on cash assets as a
whole undoubtedly fell. For an unduplicated cash total for the banking system as
a whole, i.e., high-powered money holdings, the yield was zero throughout, so the
ratio of yields remained unchanged, while the spread fell. The change in conditions
of supply therefore fostered a rise in the fraction of assets held in the form of cash
assets.
3
3 It should be noted that the customer loan rate is not, like all the other rates
in Chart 35, a market rate, and may for that reason be subject to a wider margin
of error. In addition, other dimensions of the loan, such as collateral conditions,
the size of the compensating balance borrowers are required to hold, and so on,
may vary more than for market rates.
3
4 The increased demand for short- relative to long-term securities was no
doubt partly motivated by a belief that rates of interest were likely to rise in the
future. That expectation would make long securities less attractive than short at
the same rate, or at a difference in rates that prevailed earlier when such expecta-
tions were not held. David Meiselman argues persuasively that the whole of the
change in spread between one-year and longer rates on corporate bonds can be
explained by the shift in relative demand arising from such expectation effects
(see his The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-
Hall, 1962). Meiselman does not consider in detail rates for periods of less than a
year, which play a crucial role in our analysis.
These expectation effects do not, of course, explain the widening of the spread
between more and less risky investments of the same maturity; that must haveNEW DEAL CHANGES 39
securities of varying maturity between banks and other holders could
only have occurred because the change in bank preferences for liquidity
was greater than any corresponding change in the preferences of other
holders.
The evidence furnished by interest rates is confirmed by a study by
C. O. Hardy and Jacob Viner of the availability of bank credit in the
Chicago Federal Reserve District during the period from the bank holiday
to September 1, 1934. The study, based mainly on interviews with bankers
and brokers, was undertaken "to find out so far as possible whether, and
to what extent, the small volume of bank loans was due to the desire of
banks to retain or attain liquidity, to the attitude of examining officials, to
the unwillingness of businessmen to assume the risk of borrowing to main-
tain or expand their operations, or to the impairment of the capital of
many businessmen by losses incurred during the depression which made
reflected a shift of preference toward the less risky for other reasons. As the next
sentence in the text indicates, they can explain the change in distribution of gov-
ernment securities among banks and others only if banks had different expectations
from those of others, believing that rates would rise more rapidly in the rather
short-term future than others thought they would.
While Meiselman's conclusion may be entirely justified for rates for periods of
a year or longer and while its being the correct explanation for rates for shorter
periods would not seriously affect the conclusions stated in the text—since they
do not depend on the reason for the shift in preferences—we do not believe that
his conclusion can be extended to the rates for very short periods with which we
are most concerned. As we have seen, banks came to play a dominant role in the
market for some of these assets, and the behavior of the corresponding rates
therefore hinges critically on shifts in banks' preferences. The evidence we adduce
below to explain the notable increase in bank cash assets strongly supports the
view that the 1929-33 experience led banks to attach a much greater value than
formerly to assets that could be converted into known cash sums at need and at
short notice for reasons other than the belief that interest rates would rise. Their
experience, more trying than that of other asset holders, must have impressed them
with their greater need to hedge against uncertainty; and the structure of their
liabilities meant that such hedging required them to shift to shorter-term securi-
ties, as they did.
A shift in bank preferences for reasons other than expectations about future
rates therefore explains in a simple and straightforward manner (1) the very great
increase in spread for very short-term relative not only to long-term but also to
one-year rates; (2) the sharp shift in composition of bank portfolios; (3) the
shift in the distribution of government securities among holders; and (4) the
behavior of "excess reserves." The expectations hypothesis can then supplement
this explanation for banks and be the major explanation for longer rates and other
holders.
In more recent work on the cyclical behavior of the term structure of interest
rates, Reuben Kessel has found that combining the expectations hypothesis with
liquidity considerations gives a more satisfactory explanation of the empirical evi-
dence than either gives alone for maturities b,oth shorter and longer than one year.
While the finding does not demonstrate that shifts in liquidity preference played
the role we assign to them, it perhaps makes that interpretation more plausible
than it would otherwise be (see his forthcoming "The Cyclical Behavior of the
Term Structure of Interest Rates," an NBER study, in preparation).40 NEW DEAL CHANGES
them poor banking risks." The authors concluded: "That there exists a
genuine unsatisfied demand for credit on the part of solvent borrowers,
many of whom could make economically sound use of working capital
. . . That one of the most serious aspects of this unsatisfied demand is the
pressure for liquidation of old working-capital loans, even sound ones.
That this pressure is partly due to a determination on the part of bankers
to avoid a recurrence of the errors to which they attribute much of the
responsibility for the recent wave of bank failures . . . ."
3
5
The increased fraction of bank assets held in the form of cash assets,
unlike the increased fraction held in short-term investments, can be partly
explained by supply considerations. As noted, a lagged reaction to the gold
inflow may have contributed to the increase. More important, because
longer lasting, rates of interest in general fell, which made cash assets
more attractive compared to other assets (or, equivalently, less costly in
terms of income sacrificed). Moreover, the shift in preferences depressed
particularly the yields on short-term highly liquid assets, fostering still
more the shift into cash. For example, the yield on Treasury bills
averaged 0.515 per cent per year in 1933, 0.256 in 1934, 0.137 in 1935,
and 0.143 in 1936. After rising to 0.447 in 1937 in response to the
doubling of reserve requirements (see Chapter 9 below), it fell to 0.053
in 1938, 0.023 in 1939, and 0.014 in 1940. At those yields it was hardly
worthwhile to hold bills instead of cash. In consequence, while the ratio
of government securities to total assets for all banks reached its peak in
1936, the ratio of cash assets to total assets continued rising until 1940.
While supply considerations explain part of the shift into cash assets,
they cannot explain the whole of the shift, which was motivated also by
the same desire for liquidity as the shift into investments. To begin with,
cash assets were acquired along with investments to satisfy that desire;
after 1936, the acquisition of cash assets became the most convenient and
least costly way to achieve the desired liquidity. Indirect confirmation
of these propositions is furnished by the evidence from interest rates that
the shift into investments reflected a change in the liquidity preferences of
banks. Such a change could clearly be expected also to affect cash assets
since those assets fulfill par excellence the end desired in holding short-
term investments—convertibility into known sums at need and on short
notice. In addition, there are a number of other bits of evidence that
together are fairly decisive.
Perhaps the most striking of these is a comparison between Canadian




5 Report on the Availability of Bank Credit in the Seventh Federal Reserve
District, submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, GPO, 1935, pp. 3 and VI.
3
6 In "Liquidity Preferences of Commercial Banks," unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Chicago, 1962.NEW DEAL CHANGES 41
cyclical experience was almost the same as that of the United States from
1929 to 1939, except that it was spared any bank failures or widespread
runs on banks. Rates of interest moved in much the same way as in the
United States—to be expected from the close link between the financial
markets in the two countries. Canadian banks increased their cash assets
relative to their deposits, but by a very much smaller proportion than
did U.S. banks.
A second bit of evidence comes from Morrison's examination of
the relation in the United States between cash assets and interest rates
before 1929 and after 1939. On the basis of both earlier and later ex-
perience, the increase in cash assets in the 1930's was much larger than
the increase that might have been expected to be produced by the de-
cline in yields alone.
Our analysis of the reaction of member banks to the doubling of reserve
requirements in 1936 and 1937 is still another bit of evidence that they
had accumulated cash assets because their demand for liquidity had
risen. When the rise in reserve requirements immobilized the accumu-
lated cash, they proceeded rather promptly to accumulate additional




Tile form taken by the increase in cash assets was doubtless affected by
the prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits. Had the prohi-
bition not existed, more of the growth of cash assets might have taken the
form of balances at other commercial banks rather than at Federal Re-
serve Banks. As it was, there was no incentive to hold at other commercial
banks balances desired for their liquidity. How great this effect was is
by no means clear. The low yield on short-term assets would have meant
a low rate of interest offered for interbank balances and perhaps even a
zero rate of interest, in which case the result would have been the same.
The shift in liquidity preferences of banks was destined to be temporary.
To judge by the experience of earlier episodes,
3
8 the passage of time with-
out any extensive series of bank failures would have dulled the fears of
bank managers, leading them to set a lower premium on liquidity. In any
case, the establishment of FDIC, which was accompanied by a dramatic
reduction in the rate of bank failures, provided additional assurance
against the occurrence of "runs" of the kind that had produced the shift
in liquidity preferences. Such assurance, while by no means clear at the
start of FDIC, eventually became increasingly clear, but still it took
" See also Phillip Cagan's forthcoming monograph on determinants and effects
of changes in the money stock in the United States since 1875, a National
Bureau study, Chap. 5.
3
8 See Chap. 2, sect. 4; Chap. 3, sect. 3; and Chap. 4, sect. 6. Also see Cagan's
forthcoming study referred to in the preceding footnote, and Morrison's study
referred to in footnote 36, above.42 NEW DEAL CHANGES
time for banks to adapt their behavior to that new fact It is therefore not
surprising that the ratio of cash assets to total assets continued rising until
1940.
Though the ratio of cash assets to total assets fell drastically during
the war and remained at an even lower level thereafter, it has remained
above its 1929 level (Table 17, col. 8). The reason is not a continued
higher preference on the part of banks for cash assets but rather a rise
in reserve requirements. Banks have no choice about the form of their
required reserves. That fraction of their assets has to be kept as cash
assets—indeed, until 1959, as deposit balances at the Federal Reserve
System—and, as they found out at great cost in 1930-33, can not be
drawn upon for emergencies without precipitating suspension. A change in
a bank's cash ratio as a result of a change in reserve requirements is,
therefore, a different phenomenon from a change as a result of a shift in
asset preference.
Aggregate data on required reserves are available only for member
banks. Accordingly, Table 19, which eliminates required reserves from
both the numerator and denominator of the cash ratio, is restricted to
member banks. In 1929, member banks held 11.3 per cent of their assets
in excess of required reserves in the form of cash in vault, cash items in
the process of collection, and balances at banks (commercial and Federal
Reserve) in excess of required reserves. That ratio rose steadily from
1933 to 1936, then fell as a result of the doubling of reserve requirements
in 1936-37, then resumed its rise to a peak of nearly 30 per cent in 1940.
By 1945 it was back to roughly its 1929 level, and it has fluctuated around
that level since, whereas the ratio of all cash assets to total assets (col-
umn 3) has fluctuated around a level several percentage points higher
than the 1929 level.
Unlike the cash ratio, the ratio of investments to loans continued to
rise during the war. Although it has fallen since, it is still about twice
its 1929 level. However, the divergent behavior of the cash ratio and
the investment-loan ratio does not imply that the effect of the increased
preference for liquidity on the demand for investments lasted longer
than its effect on the demand for cash. Just as the demand for both cate-
gories expanded together from 1932 to 1940, so the demand for both
could have declined together subsequently, since the divergent behavior
of the actual ratios can be readily explained by differences on the supply
side. During the war there was a rapid increase in the supply of govern-
ment securities, and probably also a decrease in the relative demand for
bank loans because many firms were financed by federal government
funds. As is consistent with this interpretation, the spread in yield between
highly liquid and less liquid bank assets narrowed, if anything, during
the war—to an especially striking extent if government bonds whoseNEW DEAL CHANGES 43
TABLE 19
RELATION OF CASH ASSETS TO REQUIRED RESERVES AND TOTAL ASSETS,


















































































































































a June 30 or nearest available call date.
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 72 and 74, and Member Bank Call Report.
(2) The sum of reserves at Federal Reserve Banks, cash in vault, balances at domestic
and foreign banks, and cash items in process of collection, from same source as
for col. 1.
(3) Col. 2 divided by col. 1.
(4) 1929-41: Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 395-396.
1945-59: Member Bank Call Report.
1960: Average for week ending June 15, 1960, from Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Dec. I960, p. 1350.
(5) Col. 4 divided by col. 1.
(6) Computed from cols. 1, 2, and 4.44 NEW DEAL CHANGES
prices were pegged by the Federal Reserve are regarded as highly liquid
assets. After the war, the supply of government securities remained high,
and an increasing proportion of business firms found it possible to raise
funds they required on the open market. The spread of rates of return
continued to narrow through 1960. Supply conditions had reverted some-
what by that time, but not fully, to prewar conditions, hence the invest-
ment-loan ratio remained above its 1929 level.
It should be noted that our interpretation of the changes in the com-
position of bank assets and, in particular, of the emergence of a large
volume of "excess reserves" in the 1930's runs sharply counter to an inter-
pretation that is widely held
39—and one that was also implicit in Federal
Reserve policy in the 1930's and has been to a lesser degree since. Accord-
ing to that interpretation, excess reserves were primarily unneeded surplus
funds held by banks, proof of easy-money conditions and of a lack of
private demand for credit. Banks were, as it were, in metastable equilib-
rium. Additional funds acquired by banks were in the main simply added
to cash balances; additional demands on banks were met by reducing
balances. There was no uryque desired structure of assets, corresponding
to given rates of return on assets, disturbance of which would prompt
banks to seek to restore that same structure; they would be content to
retain the new one. On this view, changes in reserve requirements had no
effect, so long as they did not absorb all excess reserves either for all banks
or for any significant group of banks.
4
0 This was the view explicitly
presented by the Board of Governors in connection with the doubling of
reserve requirements in 1936-37.
4
1 As we have already implied and as we
3
9 Woodlief Thomas, "Monetary Controls," Banking Studies, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1941, reprinted 1947, pp. 341-342; Allan Sproul,
"Changing Concepts of Central Banking," Money, Trade, and Economic Growth,
in Honor of J. H. Williams, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 297-298; R. A.
Gordon, Business Fluctuations, New York, Harper, 1952, pp. 398-399. An inter-
pretation essentially identical with ours is presented by Paul A. Samuelson, "Fis-
cal Policy and Income Determination," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug.
1942, p. 594.
4
0 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1936,
p. 15; 1937, p. 2; E. A. Goldenweiser, Monetary Management, New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1949, pp. 57—59; and idem, American Monetary Policy, New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1951, pp. 175-182.
4
1 Opinions expressed within the System were less dogmatic and unqualified than
official justifications for the actions taken were, though their general tenor was
the same.
A series of memoranda dealing with excess reserves, prepared at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York from 1934 on, apparently provided the initial intel-
lectual basis for doubling reserve requirements (see Chap. 9, sect. 4). These
memoranda, as well as statements by Bank officials to the New York board of
directors, the FOMC, and the Board of Governors, present essentially the view
outlined above, when they deal with the specific subject of the large accumulation
of excess reserves and the measures that should be taken to deal with them. For
example, a memorandum, dated Nov. 7, 1935, "Plans for Credit Control," states,
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point out in more detail in Chapter 9 in discussing the 1937-38 contrac-
tion, the reaction to the doubling of requirements contradicts the official
view and supports our interpretation.
2. Changes in the Monetary Standard
GOLD POLICY
President Roosevelt's proclamation of a bank holiday on March 6, 1933,
also prohibited banks from paying out gold or dealing in foreign ex-
change during the bank holiday. The Emergency Banking Act of March 9,
1933, which confirmed and extended the March 6 proclamation, granted
the President emergency powers over banking transactions and over for-
eign exchange dealings and gold and currency movements. The next day,
March 10, the President issued an executive order extending the restric-
tions on gold and foreign exchange dealings beyond the banking holiday
proper and, in effect, prohibiting gold payments by banking and non-
banking institutions alike, unless permitted by the Secretary of the
Treasury under license. The order also narrowly limited foreign exchange
dealings. Those measures were a precursor to nearly a year of tinkering
with the monetary standard which culminated in the most far-reaching
alteration in its legal structure since the departure from gold during the
Civil War and subsequent resumption in 1879.
4
2
Despite the effective suspension of gold payments, the price of gold,
would now have been entirely absorbed by the increase in the required reserves
[as a result of deposit expansion]"—a statement implying that deposit expansion
would have been identical even if the reserves had increased at a much slower
rate (Harrison, Notes, Vol. VI; also Harrison, Special, no. 9, p. 2). At the same
time, this view is occasionally qualified by the recognition that the same level of
excess reserves may have different effects on the willingness of member banks
to expand their earning assets, and in different contexts statements are made that
go even further in the direction of our intepretation. For example, President
Harrison suggested, in commenting on the first rise in reserve requirements in
1936, that it "lessened to some extent the pressure upon banks to invest their
surplus funds," i.e., that it had a contractionary effect (Harrison, Open Market,
Vol. IV, unrevised minutes of meeting, Nov. 19, 1936). The explicit reconciliation
of the two strands in System opinion rested on a distinction of magnitude.
The conclusion we draw from perusal of the Harrison Papers is that the officers
of the New York Bank quite explicitly recognized the changed liquidity preferences
of banks and the desirability of excess reserves to meet them from 1930 to 1934
or 1935 (see Chap. 7, sect. 5), but they could not accept excess reserves so large
in magnitude as those that accumulated thereafter as a reflection of such changed
preferences, hence were led to the view that they had no constructive effects.
4
3 For a detailed chronology and description of the steps taken during the year,
see J. D. Paris, Monetary Policies of the United States, 1932-1938, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1938, pp. 12-32 and 118-120. For a different kind of
description of the same events, see F. A. Pearson, W. I. Myers, and A. R. Gans,
"Warren as Presidential Adviser," Farm Economics, New York State College of
Agriculture, Cornell University, No. 211, Dec. 1957.46 NEW DEAL CHANGES
or the rate of exchange between the dollar and currencies like the French
franc that remained rigidly linked to gold, hovered around "par" for over
a month. The suspension was presumably regarded as part of the banking
emergency and hence expected to be temporary; foreign exchange transac-
tions were strictly controlled and limited; the administration made no
official announcement that it proposed to permit the dollar to depreciate
or be devalued; and after some weeks, several licenses to export gold were
granted. Moreover, the technical gold position was sufficiently strong so
that there was little doubt the preceding gold parity could have been
maintained if desired; the ratio of the gold stock to the total stock of
money was higher than at any time since 1914.
One important step, unprecedented in the United States, was taken
during this period. On April 5, an executive order forbade the "hoarding"
of gold and required all holders of gold, including member banks, to
deliver their holdings of gold coin, bullion, or certificates to Federal
Reserve Banks on or before May 1 except for rare coins, reasonable
amounts for use in industry and the arts, and a maximum of $100 per
person in gold coin and gold certificates.'*
3 The gold coin and gold certifi-
cates were exchanged for other currency or deposits at face value, and the
bullion was paid for at the legal price of $20.67 per fine ounce. The
"nationalization" of gold outside Federal Reserve Banks was later com-
pleted by an order of the Secretary of the Treasury, dated December 28,
1933, excepting only rare coins and a few other minor items from the
requirement that all gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates be
delivered to the Treasurer of the United States at face value correspond-
ing to the legal price of $20.67 per fine ounce. The expiration date for the
surrender of gold was later set as January 17, 1934,
4
4 when the market
price of gold was in the neighborhood of $33 per fine ounce.
4
5
"Federal Reserve Bulletin, Apr. 1933, pp. 213-214.
"FRB, Feb. 1934, p. 80.
* Pearson, Myers, and Gans, "Warren," p. 5647. The amount of gold coin and
gold certificates outside the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks at the end
of Feb. 1933 was estimated by contemporary Federal Reserve statistics to be $1,220
million, of which $571 million was in coin and $649 million in certificates (FRB,
Feb. 1934, p. 95). These statistics show the amount of gold coin outside the
Treasury and Federal Reserve as falling to $367 million at the end of Mar. 1933
(before the first executive order requiring the transfer of gold coin), to $335 mil-
lion at the end of Apr., then declining gradually to $311 million at the end of
Dec. and to $287 million at the end of Jan. 1934 (ibid.). The gold coin then
outstanding was dropped from the monthly circulation statement as of Jan. 31,
1934. It was assumed that that amount had mainly been lost, destroyed, exported
without record, or was in numismatic collections, although some unknown amount
remained illegally in private hands. Since the amount turned in to the Treasury
at $20.67 an ounce between June 1934 and June 1960 totaled less than $12 mil-
lion, it might be concluded that the amount of gold coin outstanding after Jan.
1934 was not significant.
The experience with national bank notes analyzed in footnote 20, however, in-NEW DEAL CHANGES 47
An executive order of April 20, 1933, extending and revising the gold
embargo, and comments by the President at his news conference the
preceding day ended the period of stability in the price of gold. The
President made it clear that the administration intended to permit the
dollar to depreciate in terms of foreign currencies as a means of achieving
a rise in domestic prices. The order applied the restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions not only to banks licensed under the executive
dicates that losses could have accounted for only a small part of the $287 million
still outstanding at the end of Jan. 1934. Whatever losses there were presumably-
occurred during the period from 1907 to 1933, since in 1907 the Director of the
Mint presented revised estimates of gold coin in circulation which took into ac-
count probable losses from 1873 to 1907. The average amount of gold coin re-
ported as in circulation from 1907 through 1933 was $490 million. The rate of
loss of gold coin would presumably be substantially less than that of national bank
notes. Even the rate of loss for national bank notes of roughly $1 per $1,000 per
year would have meant a loss of only $12.7 million over the 26-year period.
Gould unrecorded gold exports have accounted for most of the $287 million of
gold coin not surrendered by the public by the end of Jan. 1934? We think not.
The two main channels for export of gold without record before 1934 were immi-
grant remittances and travel expenditures. To estimate the probable size of such
exports, we applied to the balance of payments figures for those items, 1907-33,
the ratio of the gold correction for 1873-1900 to similar balance of payments
figures for those years. The estimate so obtained is $80 million, but it may well
be an overstatement: (1) the gold correction for the earlier period is only in part
—although probably in major part—attributable to unrecorded exports; (2) travel
expenditures for the earlier period are limited to passengers' transportation and
travel expenses, while for the period since 1907 they also include import freight
payments.
If the estimates of gold lost and gold exported without record are added to the
gold coin returned to the Treasury since 1934, we are still far short of accounting
for even half of the $287 million. We therefore concluded that in Jan. 1934 the
bulk of the $287 million was retained illegally in private hands. For this reason
we restored to the gold stock and gold circulation the $287 million which the
Federal Reserve subtracted for 1914-33 from the figures as originally published.
Since gold coin has not been a component of the money stock since Jan. 31, 1934,
our series exclude the $287 million since that date.
Until July 14, 1954, it was lawful for U.S. citizens to hold as rare coin only
two coins of each specimen minted. A regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury
(Federal Register, XIX, No. 135, July 14, 1954, p. 4331) removed any limit on
the possession of gold coin minted before Apr. 5, 1933, designating all such coins
as of numismatic value.
Although it has been illegal since 1933 for the public to hold gold certificates,
amounts outstanding were not dropped from the monthly circulation statement
after Jan. 1934, as they were for gold coin. There has, however, been a substantial
decline in gold certificates from the total of $178 million recorded as outstanding
at the end of Jan. 1934. At the end of 1960 only $30 million was still reported
in circulation, most of which probably may not be returned to the Treasury. Appli-
cation of the loss rate for national bank notes to the average amount of gold
certificates in circulation from 1880 through 1933 yields a probable loss of $24
million over the 53-year period. However, in all likelihood this is an overestimate,
since gold certificates were surely subject to a decidedly smaller rate of loss. This
judgment is based on the fact that, compared with national bank notes, gold
certificates were of higher denominations, and a larger proportion of the amounts
outstanding was held in bank vaults.48 NEW DEAL CHANGES
order of March 10, but also to all persons dealing in foreign exchange.
On the same day, the Thomas amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment
Act was offered in Congress. The amendment, enacted into law on
May 12, and explicitly directed at achieving a price rise through expan-
sion of the money stock, contained a provision authorizing the President
to reduce the gold content of the dollar to as low as 50 per cent of its
former weight. The dollar price of gold immediately started rising, which
is to say that so also did the dollar price of foreign currencies, including
both those like the French franc that remained on gold and those like
the pound sterling that had gone off gold at an earlier date. In the next
three months, the market price of gold rose to $30 an ounce, and there-
after fluctuated erratically between a low of about $27 and a high of
nearly $35 until January 30, 1934, when the Gold Reserve Act was
passed.
4
6 During that period, the United States had a floating exchange
rate determined in the market from day to day, as in the period from
1862 to 1879. However, there was considerably greater government inter-
ference in the market. On September 8, 1933, an official gold price, to be
fixed daily at the estimated world market figure less shipping and in-
surance cost, was established. The Treasury agreed to buy gold at that
price to give American gold miners a price as high as they could have
obtained by export in the absence of the export embargo.
Starting in October, the government intervened actively to raise the
price of gold. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized
to buy newly mined domestic gold from October 25 on, and a few days
later, through the agency of the Federal Reserve Banks, to buy gold
abroad. The purchase price was raised almost daily. For a time, the large
scale of RFC purchases abroad made the announced price for newly-
mined domestic gold the effective market price. From the end of Novem-
ber, however, until the end of January 1934, the announced price ex-
ceeded the market price abroad.
4
7
The aim of the gold policy was to raise the price level of commodities,
particularly farm products and raw materials, which sustained the greatest
relative decline during the preceding years of deflation. That aim was
pursued simultaneously through other New Deal measures, of which the
National Recovery Administration's promulgation of "codes" and the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration's production controls were the
most notable. It was not pursued, as we have seen, through any sub-
stantial increase in the quantity of money, though the Thomas amendment
provided the legal basis for an increase even without the concurrence of
the Federal Reserve System. Most farm products and raw materials ex-
ported by the United States had a world market in which this country,
4
6 See Pearson, Myers, and Gans, "Warren," pp. 5636, 5645-5647.
" Pearson, Myers, and Gans, "Warren," p. 5646.NEW DEAL CHANGES 49
while sometimes important as both supplier and purchaser, was seldom
dominant. The prices of such commodities in foreign currencies were
determined by world demand and supply and were affected by events in
the United States only insofar as these, in turn, affected the amounts
supplied and demanded by the United States. Even then, such prices
were affected much less than in proportion to the changes in U.S. sales
and purchases. Hence, the decline in the foreign exchange value of the
dollar meaat a roughly proportional rise in the dollar price of such com-
modities, which is, of course, what did happen to the dollar prices of
cotton, petroleum products, leaf tobacco, wheat, and similar items. The
aim of the gold policy to raise prices of farm products and raw materials
was therefore largely achieved.
The decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar was initially a
product of speculative sale of dollars in the expectation of devaluation—
a short-term capital outflow. The decline was sustained by shifts in the
demand (by which, as always, we mean demand schedules) for imports
and supply (again, supply schedules) of exports produced by the cessation
of internal deflation. The resolution of the banking panic and restoration
of confidence in the monetary system were accompanied by an increase in
velocity, a higher rate of spending, and rising prices. As a result, prices
rose in the United States relative to prices in other countries. If the ex-
change value of the dollar had not fallen, the price rise would have
discouraged exports and encouraged imports. Those forces were subse-
quently reinforced by U.S. purchase of gold at home and abroad.
U.S. purchase of domestic gold involved a reduction in the supply
of goods for export, since gold is a potential export good, and hence a
reduction in the demand for dollars by holders of other currencies (to
buy the domestically produced gold). The purchase of foreign gold in-
volved an increase in the demand for goods for import (namely, gold)
and hence in the supply of dollars offered in exchange for foreign cur-
rencies (to buy foreign gold). The combined effect was to create a
potential deficit in the U.S. balance of payments at the former exchange
rate. Given a flexible rate, the potential deficit was closed by a deprecia-
tion of the dollar sufficient to generate, through an increase in exports or
a decline in imports or a movement of speculative funds, an amount of
foreign currencies exceeding the amount demanded for other purposes by
enough to pay for the gold.
These effects depended very little on the fact that gold was the com-
modity purchased. Given a floating exchange rate, essentially the same
effects on the dollar prices of internationally traded goods would have
followed from the same dollar volume of government purchase of wheat
or perfume or foreign-owned art masterpieces, or from the economically
equivalent program, adopted after World War II, of building up stock-50 NEW DEAL CHANGES
piles of foreign-produced strategic goods. Of course, had one of these other
commodities been used as the vehicle for the purchase program, gold would
have been one of the class of domestically produced goods, export of which
was stimulated by the U.S. depreciation of the dollar, and one of the
class of foreign-produced goods, import of which was discouraged by the
depreciation. Consequently, the hypothetical alternative purchase program
would have tended to make the net inflow of gold less or the net outflow
of gold more than it otherwise would have been. As it was^the use of
gold as the vehicle necessarily meant an accumulation of gold, just as the
use of wheat or perfume or foreign-owned masterpieces would have
meant an accumulation of that commodity.
The choice of gold as the vehicle did have an important effect on the
impact of the program on foreign countries. In the first place—and a
corresponding effect would be present for any particular commodity—
the program had a special impact on gold-producing countries. In the
second place—and this effect would be present only for a commodity
serving as the basis of a monetary standard—it had a special impact on
gold-standard countries. Being committed to sell gold at a fixed price in
terms of their own currency, those countries necessarily experienced pres-
sure on their gold reserves, which in turn necessitated either abandon-
ment of the gold standard or internal deflationary pressure. Entirely aside
from the changes in the relative demands and supplies of goods they im-
ported or exported arising out of the gold-purchase program, those




** It may help to put this point somewhat differently in terms of a particular
example. Suppose the purchase program had been for French perfumes. Then,
given the French internal monetary position, the price of such perfumes in francs
would rise, the price in francs of other French exports would tend to fall (since
the depreciation of the dollar would make them more expensive to Americans in
dollars and hence reduce the quantity demanded at the former franc price), and
the price in francs of goods imported into France from the U.S. would also tend
to fall (since the depreciation of the dollar would reduce the franc equivalent of
the former dollar price). Nothing can be said about the remaining prices: some
might remain constant, some fall and some rise, depending on their substitutability
in consumption and production for other exports and imports.
Now let the purchase program be for gold, either a program to spend a fixed
number of dollars per month for gold, or to buy a fixed number of ounces per
month at the market price in dollars, or to buy whatever number of ounces would
be offered at a fixed dollar price higher than the prior market price, or any com-
bination of these programs. Let France be on a gold standard and be the only
country on a gold standard. Suppose, first, that France takes whatever measures
are necessary to preserve her gold reserves intact and hence to force all U.S. gold
purchases to be made elsewhere. This could occur through a general deflation of
all French prices sufficient to make the depreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the franc
enough greater than its depreciation vis-a-vis other (nongold-standard) currencies
so that the fixed franc price for gold, times the dollar price of the franc, yields a
dollar price of gold above (or just equal to) the market price of gold in otherNEW DEAL CHANGES 51
The device used to achieve a decline in the exchange value of the
dollar—borrowing funds (through the issue of RFC securities) to pur-
chase gold—was not unprecedented. The identical device was incor-
porated in the Resumption Act and employed before 1879 but that time
for precisely the opposite purpose: to promote a rise in the exchange value
of the dollar. In discussing that episode, we pointed out that the mechani-
cal as opposed to the psychological effects of the accumulation of a gold
reserve rendered resumption more rather than less difficult. The reasons
are precisely those just given to explain why the gold purchases con-
tributed to the decline in the exchange value of the dollar. In the one
case as in the other, it is doubtful that the device was nearly so important
as the less dramatic forces that were at work beneath the surface, but this
is clearer in the 1879 episode when the device worked against the objec-
tive than it is in the 1933 episode when it fostered the objective.
A major obstacle to using gold as a vehicle for lowering the exchange
value of the dollar and thereby raising prices was the existence of the so-
called gold clause in many government and private obligations and in
private contracts. That clause, whose use dated back to the greenback
period after the Civil War, required payment either in gold proper, or
in a nominal amount of currency equal to the value of a specified weight
of gold. It was designed precisely to protect lenders and others against
currency depreciation. The clause, if honored, would have multiplied the
nominal obligations of the federal government and of many private bor-
rowers for interest and principal of debt by the ratio of the new price of
gold to the old price of gold. Also it would have reduced the stimulating
currencies, times the price of those currencies in dollars. It would then be cheaper
for the U.S. to buy gold in those other countries than to acquire it from France
at the fixed franc price. France would have avoided a reduction of her gold re-
serve at the cost of undergoing a general deflation. However, even if we ignore the
costs of the deflationary process, this involves a greater adjustment than is appro-
priate. At the lower nominal price level in France, the former gold reserves would
now have a greater value in terms of goods and services. Hence, it would be appro-
priate for France to make part of the adjustment through a reduction in gold
reserves measured in ounces of gold.
This final point makes clear how the adjustment would tend to occur if all
countries except the U.S. were on a gold standard. The extra gold demanded by
the U.S. would be provided both from new production and by a reduction in re-
serves that would otherwise have been held, matched by a reduction in the price
level in terms of gold in the rest of the world.
For the United States, the primary effect of the existence of some gold-standard
countries or of all other countries' adherence to the gold standard would be a change
in the magnitude of the depreciation of the dollar in terms of foreign currency,
since the depreciation would have to be enough to offset not only the change in
"real" demands and supplies produced by the purchase program but also the de-
cline in the general level of prices in terms of gold in the rest of the world. If
the 'program selected provided for spending a fixed number of dollars per month
on gold, there would be a secondary effect arising out of the fact that the same
number of dollars expended would buy different quantities of gold.52 NEW DEAL CHANGES
effects on private activity of the reduction in the ratio of debt to income
which, it was hoped, would result from currency depreciation. Accord-
ingly, a joint resolution was introduced into Congress on May 6 and
passed on June 5, 1933, abrogating the gold clause in all public and
private contracts, past and future. In February 1935, the Supreme Court,




At the outset, the gold policy was one of two mutually inconsistent
policies with respect to the monetary standard simultaneously pursued
by President Roosevelt. The other was the organization of a World Mone-
tary and Economic Conference which convened in London, June 1933.
President Hoover had set in train the arrangements for the convocation
of the conference in May 1932, and it was originally scheduled to be held
in January 1933. The aim of the conference was to achieve cooperative
action on international economic problems, and hopes were high that it
would produce an agreement stabilizing foreign exchange arrangements.
But the conference was nearly a complete failure. One reason was that,
while it was in process, the President apparently decided definitely to
adopt the path of currency depreciation. He sent a message to the con-
ference on July 2, 1933, which dissociated the United States from any
attempt to achieve what was described as a "temporary and probably an
artificial stability in foreign exchange on the part of a few large countries"
and was termed a "specious fallacy."
5
0 The message was at the time given
much of the public blame for the failure of the conference. However,
whatever the President might have said and however consistent U.S.
policy might have been, it seems dubious that the economic preconditions
existed for a viable exchange stabilization agreement. The fundamental
difficulties were the probable incompatibility of the exchange rates of the
sterling bloc and of the nations that still remained on gold, and the un-
willingness at the time of the gold-bloc countries to change their gold
parities.
The period of a variable price for gold came to an end on January 31,
1934, when the President, under the authority of the Gold Reserve Act
passed the day before, specified a fixed buying and selling price of $35 an
ounce for gold, thereby devaluing the gold dollar to 59.06 per cent of its
former weight. Under the terms of the act, title to all gold coin and
bullion was to be vested in the United States; all gold coins were to be
withdrawn from circulation and melted into bullion and further gold
4
9 The Court upheld the right of Congress to abrogate the gold clause in private,
state, and city obligations, but not in those of the U.S. government. The Court,
however, denied the claim of a plaintiff for a judgment for $16,931.25 in legal
tender currency on his U.S. government bond of $10,000, on the ground that he
had not shown any loss whatever in relation to purchasing power.
5
0 Message reproduced in Paris, Monetary Policies, pp. 166—167.NEW DEAL CHANGES 53
coinage was to be discontinued; the Secretary of the Treasury was to
control all dealings in gold; and the President was authorized to fix the




Since the Treasury had formerly valued its own gold holdings at $20.67
an ounce and paid only that price for the gold it acquired from private
individuals, commercial banks, and the Federal Reserve System, it realized
a large "paper" profit from the revaluation of the dollar; which is to say,
the Treasury could print additional paper money entitled "gold certif-
icates" to a nominal value of nearly $3 billion without acquiring addi-
tional gold and yet conform to the legal requirement that it hold a
specified weight of gold (now less than before) for each dollar printed.
Those gold certificates could not legally be held by private individuals,
but they could be held by Federal Reserve Banks. Accordingly, to realize
its "profits," the Treasury had to turn over gold certificates to the Federal
Reserve System, receiving in return a deposit credit that it could convert
into Federal Reserve notes or pay out by check. Stripped of its legal
trappings, the economic effect was identical with a simple grant of
authority to the Treasury to print and to put in circulation nearly $3
billion of fiat currency in addition to the $3 billion in greenbacks already





1 The President requested the legislation in a message to Congress on Jan. 15,
1934. He recommended vesting title to all gold in the United States in the govern-
ment for three reasons: (1) to end use of gold as a means of payment; (2) to
limit transfer of gold bullion to settlement of international balances; (3) and to
give the government ownership of any added dollar value of the country's gold
stock as a result of a decrease in the gold content of the dollar.
On the same day an executive order regulating transactions in foreign exchange
reaffirmed the regulations in the order of Apr. 20, 1933, requiring a Treasury
license for every transaction in foreign exchange, for transfer of credit between
banks in and outside the United States, and for export of any legal tender cur-
rency from the United States. But the order specifically excluded from the license
requirement foreign exchange transactions for usual business purposes, for reason-
able travel expenses, for fulfillment of contracts in existence before Mar. 9, 1933,
and for transfers of credit between banks in the Continental United States and
banks in its possessions. The authority of the Treasury and its agent, the Federal
Reserve Banks, to require complete information on every foreign exchange trans-
action was reaffirmed, as was the Treasury's power to prohibit types of transac-
tions not approved.
On Jan. 16, 1934, the function of buying gold of domestic origin was trans-
ferred from the RFC to the Federal Reserve Banks. The weight of the gold
dollar, as fixed in the Presidential proclamation of Jan. 31, 1934, was 15.238+
grains of standard gold 0.900 fine (or 13.714-f- grains of pure gold), which is
59.06 per cent of the weight of the old gold dollar fixed at 25.8 grains of standard
gold 0.900 fine (or 23.22 grains of pure gold). An ounce troy equals 480 grains.
The new price of gold, $35, is obtained by dividing 480 by 13.714+, as the old
price, $20.67, is obtained by dividing 480 by 23.22.
M The legal trappings do raise a problem in getting an economically meaning-54 NEW DEAL CHANGES
Of the paper profit, $2 billion was assigned to a stabilization fund set
up under the control of the Secretary of the Treasury and authorized to
deal in gold, foreign exchange, securities, and other credit instruments
for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value of the dollar.
8
3
Since February 1, 1934, the official price of gold has remained fixed at
$35 an ounce. In this sense, that date marked the return to a gold
standard. But the gold standard to which the United States returned was
very different, both domestically and internationally, from the one it had
left less than a year earlier. The Mint has since bought all gold offered
to it at the price of $35 an ounce but sells only for the purpose of foreign
payment. As noted, the holding of gold coin and bullion is forbidden
to private individuals in the United States, except for use in industry and
the arts and for numismatic holdings, and gold no longer circulates
domestically. The Federal Reserve continues to have a gold reserve re-
quirement, but the state of the reserve has not been a direct influence on
policy at any time since 1933, though it has threatened to become one
since a sharp decline in the U.S. gold stock began in 1958. For example,
when, in 1945, the System was approaching the then existing requirement
(40 per cent for notes and 35 per cent for deposits), the law was changed
to require a uniform 25 per cent.
Fixed buying and selling prices for gold have no longer been the major
reliance for maintaining rigid exchange rates with other currencies, even
those of countries nominally on gold. Instead, a new central bank organ
was created, the stabilization fund, with powers to engage in open market
purchase and sale of foreign exchange and nonmonetary gold to influence
exchange rates. During the late thirties, most of the so-called gold-bloc
countries finally left gold, and nominally floating exchange rates with
government speculation through stabilization funds became the rule.
ful breakdown of high-powered money, by assets of the monetary authorities.
One division that seems economically significant is between commodity money
(the monetary gold stock) and fiduciary money (the balance). So long as the
price of gold is unchanged, this division is fairly clear and meaningful. The
change in the price, however, raises difficulties. If all the gold is revalued at the
new price, the arithmetic makes the increase in price appear as a sudden rise in
the commodity component of high-powered money and a decline in the fiduciary
component. Economically, there is no such change. Hence our gold stock figures,
in the breakdown of high-powered money, by assets of the monetary authorities,
are expressed at cost, which means that the paper profits are kept as part of
the fiduciary component of high-powered money, but subsequent acquisitions at
the higher price are included in full in the commodity component. See also
Chap. 5, above, pp. 209-212.
5
3 Of the balance of the paper profit, $645 million was used for the re-
demption of national bank notes, which simply substituted one form of fiduciary
currency for another; $27 million was transferred to the Federal Reserve Banks
for making industrial loans; $2 million was charged off to losses in melting gold
coins; and $141 million remained in the General Fund cash balance (see Paris,
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During the war, many countries fixed "official" exchange rates but sought
to maintain them by extensive control over foreign exchange transactions,
imitating the devices developed by Schacht for Germany in the 1930's,
rather than by free purchase or sale at fixed prices of either gold or
foreign exchange. Since then, an even wider variety of actual arrange-
ments has coexisted.
Perhaps the best description of the role of gold in the United States
since 1934 is that, rather than being the basis of the monetary system,
it is a commodity whose price is officially supported in the same way as
the price of wheat, for example, has been under various agricultural
programs. The major differences are that the support price for agricultural
products is paid only to domestic producers, the gold-support price to
foreign as well as domestic; the agricultural products accumulated are
freely sold at the support prices to anyone, the gold only to certain foreign
purchasers and not to any domestic ones. In consequence, the gold pro-
gram has set a floor under the world price of gold in terms of dollars.
The substitution in January 1934 of a fixed price for gold, rather than a
variable price as under the earlier purchase program, meant that the
number of dollars spent on gold was no longer under the direct control of
U.S. authorities. Having fixed the price, they were committed to buy all
that was offered. But the effects of such purchases were the same as under
the earlier program. For the United States, the purchases meant an in-
crease in the dollar value of other exports relative to the dollar value of
imports, thanks to a rise in prices of internationally traded goods relative
to domestic goods through the combined effect of changes in exchange
rates and in domestic price levels of the various countries. For gold-
producing countries, the purchases meant an increased price for one of
their products, hence an expansion in the gold industry relative to other
industries and a rise in income. For gold-standard countries, the price
fixed for gold by the United States determined the rate of exchange be-
tween their currencies and dollars. They either had to adjust their internal
price level to that new rate—in the process presumably disposing of some
of their reserves as measured in ounces of gold—or to change their own
fixed price for gold. For all gold-standard and gold-producing countries
except the United States and for nongold-standard and nongold-produc-
ing countries, the gold purchases meant a reshuffling of international trade
in response to a decreased U.S. demand for products other than gold,
and an increased demand for such products by gold-producing countries;
the program meant an increased supply of products from the United States
and a decreased supply from gold-producing countries. Finally, interna-
tional trade had to adjust to measures adopted by gold-standard countries
to meet loss of their reserves.
The price fixed for gold initially overvalued the product, of course,56 NEW DEAL CHANGES
and therefore stimulated a rapid increase in production and a rapid ac-
cumulation of government stocks. Production in the United States includ-
ing its possessions rose from less than 2.6 million ounces in 1933 to 6
million in 1940; in the world, from 25 million ounces in 1933 to 41
million in 1940. The rise in prices of other commodities and services since
1940 has lowered the relative price of gold and reduced U.S. gold output
(1960) below its 1933 level, though world output still exceeds the level
of that year. The gold stock in the Treasury rose from 200 million ounces
when the support price was fixed in early 1934 to 630 million ounces by
the end of 1940, a rise that was 1% times as much as aggregate world
output during the intervening period. The gold stock declined somewhat
during the war, then rose to an all-time high in 1949. By the end of 1960
it had fallen again to about 510 million ounces, still about 2% times its
level when the fixed price was established.
In purchasing gold, as in purchasing agricultural or other commodities,
the U.S. government can be said to have three proximate sources of
funds:
5
4 tax receipts, borrowing, or creation of money.
5
5 The one differ-
ence is that the support program for other commodities (excepting silver,
for which see below) carries with it no authorization to create money,
whereas the support program for gold does, thereby automatically provid-
ing the financial means for its continuance. Treasury deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks can be increased through gold purchases by gold certificate
credits equal to the amount of gold purchased times the official price of
gold. Except for a minor handling charge (% of 1 per cent), this has
also been, in practice, the amount the Treasury spent by drawing a check
on its deposits in acquiring gold. Gold purchases are usually financed in
this way; hence, increases in the gold stockpile produce no automatic
budgetary pressure. The link between gold purchases and Treasury
authorization to create high-powered money is, of course, the main
remnant of the historical role of gold, and still serves to give gold some
special monetary significance. The one important occasion when a dif-
ferent method of finance was used was in 1937, when the Treasury
"sterilized" gold by paying for gold with funds raised through security
issues (see Chapter 9, section 3).
It is easier to describe the gold policy of the United States since 1934
than it is to describe the resulting monetary standard of the United States.
8
4 The word proximate is intended as a warning of the oversimplification in-
volved in associating particular expenditures with particular receipts.
6
5 It might be more meaningful to describe the two latter as borrowing in
interest-bearing form and borrowing in noninterest-bearing form. More funda-
mentally still, money creation may itself be either borrowing (if prices are not
raised thereby) or taxation (if prices are raised). See Friedman, "Discussion of
the Inflationary Gap," Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press,
1955, p. 257; also, above, Chap. 2, footnote 64, and Chap. 5, footnote 35.NEW DEAL CHANGES 57
It is not a gold standard in the sense that the volume of gold or the
maintenance of the nominal value of gold at a fixed price can be said to
determine directly or even at several removes the volume of money. It is
conventional to term it—as President Roosevelt did—a managed stand-
ard, but that simply evades the difficult problems of definition. It is
clearly a fiduciary rather than a commodity standard, but it is not possible
to specify briefly who manages its quantity and on what principles. The
Federal Reserve System, the Treasury, and still other agencies have
affected its quantity by their actions in accordance with a wide variety
of objectives. In principle, the Federal Reserve System has the power to
make the quantity of money anything it wishes, within broad limits, but it
has seldom stated its objectives in those terms. It has sometimes, as when
it supported bond prices, explicitly relinquished its control. And it clearly
is not unaffected in its actions by gold flows. So long as the exchange rate
between the dollar and other currencies is kept fixed, the behavior of
relative stocks of money in various countries must be close to what would
be produced by gold standards yielding the same exchange rates, even
though the mechanism may be quite different. Perhaps a "discretionary
fiduciary standard" is the best simple term to characterize the monetary
standard which has evolved. If it is vague and ambiguous, so is the
standard it denotes.
The rise in the dollar price of gold-bloc currencies was at first much
greater than that of currencies not linked to gold. From January 1933 to
September 1934 the rise was 70 per cent for the currencies of France,
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, and less than 50 per
cent for the pound sterling. The gold-standard currencies therefore ap-
preciated not only relative to the dollar but also relative to other cur-
rencies. The differential appreciation measured the special impact of our
gold price-support program on the position of the gold-standard countries.
The fact that they lost gold meant that they bore, as it were, a larger
part of the effect of the expansion of U.S. exports and contraction of
U.S. imports other than gold than other countries did, and thereby
cushioned the initial impact on those other countries.
As we have seen, had nothing else intervened, the gold-standard
countries would have had to reduce their internal price levels relative
to those of other countries in order to stay on gold, which is to say, in
order to render something like the new structure of exchange rates con-
sistent with no pressure on the balance of payments. In fact, something
else did intervene, but it intensified rather than eased the problem of the
gold-standard countries. Gold purchases under the fixed price-support
program coincided with a flight of capital to the United States from
Europe largely induced by political changes: first, the rise to power of
Hitler in Germany which led to a large-scale attempt to transfer capital58 NEW DEAL CHANGES
out of Germany, particularly by Jews; then the increasing fears of war
which led to a flight of capital from France, Britain, and other European
countries.
Since the flight of capital constituted an increased demand for dollars,
its effects on exchange rates and on U.S. trade in commodities and services
other than gold were in precisely the opposite direction to those of the
gold price-support program and tended to offset them.
5
6 There was
simultaneously an increased offer of dollars for gold on the part of
the U.S. government and an increased demand on the part of foreigners
for dollars to hold. By trading assets held abroad for gold and trans-
ferring the gold to the U.S. Treasury, foreigners could acquire dollars
and the Treasury could acquire gold without in any way affecting
the rest of the U.S. balance of payments. To the extent that such
offsetting occurred, the gold program did not affect U.S. trade currents
and the relative prices of internationally traded goods in the United
States in ways described earlier. Since such changes in trade cur-
rents and relative prices tended to reduce the amount of gold offered for
sale to the United States at its fixed price, the capital inflow meant that
this country acquired a larger amount of gold at $35 an ounce than it
otherwise would have. Hence, while the capital inflow and the gold price-
support program had opposite effects on U.S. exchange rates and on
U.S. trade in commodities and services other than gold, both tended to
raise its gold stock.
For gold-standard countries that were themselves subject to a capital
8
4 If the U.S. had continued its floating exchange-rate policy of 1933 and had
fixed no firm price at which it was willing to buy the world's gold, the capital
flight would have produced an appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other
currencies, which would have discouraged exports from the U.S. and encouraged
imports into the U.S. That outcome would have produced the unfavorable balance
of trade required as the physical side of the capital import—and incidentally,
would have worked against one of the domestic objectives of New Deal policy,
namely, to raise exports relative to imports as a means of stimulating employment.
If, instead, the U.S. and other countries involved had all been on a gold standard
of the nineteenth century variety, the attempt to transfer capital to the U.S.
would have increased gold reserves in this country, even without a rise in the
dollar price of gold, and decreased gold reserves abroad; it would have increased
proportionately the money stock in the U.S. and thereby have promoted a rise
in domestic prices and income; and it would have decreased the money stock
abroad and thereby have promoted a fall in prices and income in foreign countries.
These changes would have tended to produce precisely the same shift in relative
prices and the same unfavorable balance of trade as the appreciation of the dollar
under the hypothetical floating exchange rates would have done.
To avoid misunderstanding, we should record explicitly that the actual working
out of the adjustment might be—and in our opinion would be—very different
under floating and rigid rates for reasons that are outlined in a different con-
nection in Friedman, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," Essays in Positive
Economics, pp. 157-203. Nevertheless, the character of the adjustment required
would be identical; the difference—and in some contexts an essential difference—
is the efficiency of the mechanism of adjustment.NEW DEAL CHANGES 59
outflow—that is, for all the important so-called gold-bloc countries that
had remained on gold after 1933—the capital outflow reinforced rather
than offset the effect of the gold price-support program. It required an
additional reduction in internal price levels beyond that called for by the
support program. Exports had to be still larger relative to imports if they
were to finance the capital outflow without a continued outflow of gold.
The deflation that would have been required by the combined effect of
the U.S. gold price-support program and the capital outflow was more
than the gold-bloc countries were willing to undergo, as perhaps the
effect of either alone might also have been. Accordingly, in the fall of
1936, France and Switzerland devalued their currencies in conjunction
with a tripartite agreement between the United States, France, and Great
Britain. Other gold-bloc countries either followed suit or abandoned the
gold standard.
There is no direct way to separate the opposite effects on U.S. inter-
national trade of the capital flight and the gold-price support program;
one can only record their combined effect on international trade together,
of course, with the effect of still other factors, such as the changing level
of business activity. On the whole, however, Table 20, which summarizes
the combined effect, suggests that the gold price-support program was
quantitatively more important than the flight of capital in its effects on
U.S. international trade for the years 1934-39 as a whole. The evidence
is, however, somewhat mixed, and this conclusion must therefore be re-
garded as highly tentative.
The chief ambiguity in the evidence is in the balance-of-payments
figures in the first two parts of the table. As we have seen, the gold price-
support program alone would have tended to produce an increase in the
U.S. balance of trade in commodities and services other than gold,
through either exchange rate changes, or changes in international prices
sufficient to lower U.S. prices relative to foreign prices when both were
expressed in a common currency.
5
7 The capital inflow alone would have
acted in the opposite direction. Because of errors in balance of payments
figures, it is by no means clear what actually happened. Lines 1 and 5 give
the balance of trade estimated directly from figures on imports and ex-
ports, line 1 in absolute amounts, line 5 as a percentage of national in-
come to adjust for both price changes and changes in the size of the econ-
omy. To judge from these statistics, the balance of trade was substantially
lower for 1934-39 as a whole than for the decade of the twenties, and a
trifle lower than for the depression years 1930-33. Lines 2 and 6 give the
balance of trade as estimated indirectly from figures on capital and gold
movements; the difference between the estimates in line 1 and line 2 is
5
7 Note that this is consistent with a rise in the absolute level of U.S. prices if
the exchange value of the dollar depreciates.60 NEW DEAL CHANGES
the item labeled "errors and omissions" in the official figures published
on the balance of payments. These errors and omissions are sufficiently
large to reverse the direction of difference. Lines 2 and 6 show the
balance of trade as noticeably larger in 1934-39 than in either the
twenties or 1930-33 (in line 2, the balance of trade is equal to that in
the twenties, but since prices were lower, it was decidedly larger in real
terms). Lines 1 and 5 imply that capital flows were quantitatively more
important; lines 2 and 6, that the gold-purchase program was more im-
portant.
We are inclined to put more weight on the evidence from lines 2 and
6 than on that from lines 1 and 5, for two reasons. First, an examination
of the sources of error in the figures suggests that the indirect estimates
are likely to be more accurate than the direct estimates.
5
8 Second, as we
shall see below, the price data rather unambiguously indicate that the
gold-purchase program was the more important. As it happens, the
estimates in line 6 are also the ones comparable to those we have used in
our several charts showing the relation between relative prices and capital
movements (Charts 9, 17, and 36).
From the estimates for the three years 1934-36, mostly before French
and Swiss devaluation, and the three years thereafter, 1937—39, the
dominance of the gold-purchase program appears to be clearly greater in
the second period than in the first. By providing gold, as it were, from
their monetary balances to exporters of capital, the gold-standard coun-
tries facilitated the direct offsetting of the capital and the gold move-
ments described earlier. Indeed, the figures for both lines 5 and 6 indi-
cate that, during the earlier years, the capital movement had more im-
pact on the balance of trade than did the gold flow.
The price data in the third section of Table 20 indicate that the gold
program was more important than the capital flow, despite the divergent
movement of prices in different countries, mostly reflecting the impact
of different dates of devaluation. Though many other forces may in
principle affect relative prices, these other forces have in practice been
quite minor. In the whole period from 1879 to 1914, for example, when
both Britain and the United States were continually on gold, the price
ratio like that in Table 20 (given annually in Table A-4, column 1, for
1871-1960) varied only between 90 and 106, and some of that variation,
as we have seen, can be accounted for by capital movements. Hence, these
8
8 See Balance of Payments, 1949-1951, Office of Business Economics, 1952, pp.
115—117. What is in question is whether errors and omissions are to be interpreted
as primarily unrecorded capital items or unrecorded trade and service items. If
the former, the estimates in line 1 should be more accurate; if the latter, the
estimates in line 2 should be more accurate. It should be noted that our in-
clination to accept the latter interpretation is contrary to the most widely held
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price ratios are sensitive and accurate indicators of the effects of mone-
tary changes and of such major factors as the gold program and the
capital flow.
To judge from implicit prices in the United States and cost-of-living
indexes for Britain, France, and Switzerland, U.S. prices, adjusted for
changes in exchange rates, were lower relative to prices in other countries
after 1933 than in either the twenties or 1930-33. This is the result to be
expected if the gold price-support program had a greater effect than the
capital inflow had.
The difference between British prices, on the one hand, and French
and Swiss prices, on the other, before the French and Swiss devaluation
in 1936 reflects the disproportionate initial impact of the gold-purchase
program on France and Switzerland referred to above: their gold losses
implied a large balance of payments deficit reflecting high prices internally
relative to U.S. prices. Once they devalued, the differential effect was
eliminated. Had the gold-purchase program alone been operating, one
might have expected a decline in the ratio in the table for Britain
balancing a rise in the ratios for France and Switzerland—just the reverse
of the movements after the British devaluation in 1931. In fact, what
happened was that the British ratio stayed roughly the same, while the
French and Swiss rose sharply to meet it. The reason is that the capital
outflow from those countries affected all alike and tended to raise all those
ratios above the level that would have been produced by the gold price-
support program alone.
To digress for a moment: in some ways the most striking feature of
Table 20 is the greater similarity between the balance-of-payments figures
for 1923-29 and those for 1930-33 than between either and those for
1934-39. The first two sets of figures show remarkably little trace of the
economic holocaust that was sweeping the world. The United States was
supposedly ceasing to lend to the world, yet it exported almost as much
capital in absolute amount per year from 1930 to 1933 as from 1923 to
1929 and more as a percentage of national income. The reason is,
figuratively, that, given no basic change in conditions of production,
the incentives to invest in various countries, or monetary arrangements,
the preservation of the general pattern of the figures in Table 20 was
precisely the vehicle for the international transmission and coordination
of the economic collapse, whatever its initial source. The attempt to
change these figures—for example, the attempt by the United States to
cease foreign lending—produced repercussions abroad that largely frus-
trated the attempt and forced this country, as it were, to continue lending.
Of course, had the capital flight occurred in the absence of the gold
price-support program, the U.S. balance of trade in commodities and
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was, and U.S. prices relative to foreign prices would have fallen less than
they actually did or perhaps would have risen. This is so because the
appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies produced by
the capital flow would have discouraged exports and encouraged imports.
How much less would the balance of trade have been? Since the capital
flight itself would have meant an import of gold, the balance of trade
would certainly not have been less by more than $1.67 billion (Table 20,
line 4, last column)—but this is so outside a limit that it is of little practi-
cal value. Similarly, in the absence of the capital flight, the balance of
trade would have been higher, but again no useful estimate of how much
higher can readily be made.
If we use the period 1923-29 as a basis of comparison, speak in terms
of nominal dollar sums, and neglect other factors, we may summarize the
combined impact of the gold price-support program and the capital flight
as follows. For the six years 1934 through 1939, the statistics show that
the U.S. government was buying some $1.7 billion per year more in gold
than it and its citizens were wont to; and, at the same time, the U.S.
economy was reducing the excess of its sales abroad over its purchases
abroad of other commodities and services by some $0.6 billion per year—
i.e., selling net that much less or buying net that much more—or holding
that excess constant, depending on the treatment of the $0.6 billion con-
sisting of errors and omissions in the recorded accounts (compare the
difference between lines 1 and 2 of Table 20 for 1923-29 and the same
difference for 1934-39). The foreign currency to finance that recorded
$2.3 or $1.7 billion net increase in purchases was provided by a shift from
net lending or acquisition of assets by U.S. citizens abroad of $0.8 billion
a year to net borrowings or sale of assets of some $0.8 billion a year, or by
an even larger shift in the same direction if the errors are assigned to the
capital items. The shift from the net export to the net import of capital,
in its turn, reflected mainly the desire on the part of many foreigners to
hold assets in the form of U.S. dollars or U.S. securities rather than in the
form of currencies and securities of European nations.
The same evidence is given year-by-year and over a longer period in
Chart 36 which shows the relation between relative prices in the United
States and other countries, adjusted for exchange rate changes, and
capital movements into and gold movements out of the United States
(expressed as a fraction of net national product) from 1920 to 1960.
Before 1932, the lines showing capital imports and unilateral trans-
fers alone and this sum plus the gold outflow (or its equivalent, with the
opposite sign, the balance of trade in commodities and services other than
gold) differ little from one another either in level or year-to-year move-
ments. The capital movements are so much larger in magnitude that they
dominate the gold movements. Before 1929 the year-to-year movements ofNEW DEAL CHANGES 65
CHART 36
U.S. Net International Capital Movement as a Ratio to National
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NOTE: Capital inflow, minus unilateral transfers, is plotted as plus. Gold outflow is plotted
as plus.
SOURCE: Table A-4.
both capital and the payments balance show the kind of loose relation to
movements in relative prices in the U.S. and Britain that we found for
earlier periods (see Charts 9 and 17 above).
From 1929 to 1933, a wide divergence developed between the U.S.-
British price ratio and capital movement. The price ratio rose in 1932
to a peak higher than any other value attained since 1871, the year the
series starts. The payments balance shows only a mild reflection of the
sharp rise in the price ratio and the capital movement alone a still milder
one. The reason is that Britain's departure from gold in 1931 and the
emergence of a sterling bloc and a gold bloc introduced wide diversity
into the world pattern of prices. It is riot possible during that period to
regard movements in British prices as a reliable index of movements in
world prices. This is shown in Chart 51 (p. 586) by the series expressing
U.S. prices relative to Swiss prices, which is linked to the U.S.-British
series in 1929. There was a sharp divergence between the two from 1929
to at least 1937, when they came fairly close together, only to diverge
again after World War II began in 1939. In 1933, U.S. devaluation66 NEW DEAL CHANGES
produced the same kind of decline in U.S. prices relative to Swiss prices
that British devaluation had earlier produced in British prices relative to
both U.S. and Swiss prices. For the period from 1931 on, some curve
intermediate' between the British and the Swiss would seem the ap-
propriate continuation of the earlier U.S.-British price ratio.
After 1932 and particularly after 1933 up to 1941, there was a dramatic
divergence between capital movement figures and the figures for the bal-
ance of trade in commodities and services other than gold, a divergence of
a very much larger order of magnitude than occurred before or since.
That divergence represents the unprecedentedly large gold movements
produced by the gold-purchase program and the flight of capital from
Europe. In relation to the capital movement figures alone, U.S. prices
were much lower relative to British, and even more, relative to Swiss
prices than during the twenties or later during the forties and fifties. As
we have seen, the difference reflects largely the effect of the gold-purchase
program. The balance of trade figures alone, on the other hand, show
much more nearly the same relation to the relative prices as earlier, if




The Thomas amendment, passed on May 12, 1933, and containing a pro-
vision authorizing the President to reduce the gold content of the dollar,
also gave the President sweeping powers with respect to silver. They were
hardly used until December 21, 1933, when, disappointed by the effects
of the gold-purchase program and under pressure from Senators from
silver states as well as other proponents of currency expansion, President
Roosevelt used the authority granted by the Thomas amendment to direct
U.S. mints to receive all newly produced domestic silver offered to them
up to December 31, 1937, at 64
6%9 cents an ounce (i.e., $0.6464 . . .
an ounce).
The market price of silver was at that time about 44 cents an ounce,
or some 75 per cent above the level at the end of 1932 and in early 1933.
The rise, only slightly greater than the simultaneous depreciation of the
dollar, reflected mostly the effect on all commodities with a worldwide
market of the changed foreign exchange value of the dollar. But no doubt
it was in part also a speculative rise promoted by expectations, raised by
the Thomas amendment as well as by an agreement on silver with other
countries reached at the ill-fated London Economic Conference, that the
U.S. government would "do something for silver."
The nominal monetary value of silver was, and still is, $l
2%g, or
$1.2929 ... an ounce. This value dates from 1792, when the silver dollar
8
9 We have drawn heavily on Paris, Monetary Policies, in connection with this
and with the preceding section.NEW DEAL CHANGES 67
was defined as containing 371.25 grains of pure silver.
6
0 But it had not
been an effective market price since the gold content of the dollar had
been reduced in 1834. From 1834 to 1873, the Mint ratio then estab-
lished overvalued gold, hence the market value of silver was higher than
$ 1.29—{—, and none was coined; the United States, though nominally bi-
metallic, was effectively on gold (excluding the greenback period). After
1873, when free coinage was not permitted, silver fell in value relative to
gold (Chapter 3, footnote 52), a trend that though irregular was inter-
rupted significantly only in 1889-90, thanks to the earlier silver purchase
programs of 1878-90 and 1890-93, and again during World War I.
Except for World War I, the market price since the turn of the century
had generally been less than half the nominal mint value. Since that date,
the U.S. government had made no substantial silver purchases, except
after World War I to replace silver that had been shipped to India during
the war (see above, Chapter 5, footnote 31). Silver had remained in a
monetary limbo with respect to new acquisitions: it was used for sub-
sidiary coin, a small volume of standard silver dollars circulated mostly
in silver states, and a roughly fixed stock of silver certificates remained
as a relic of the earlier silver agitation.
6
1 The amount of silver in use as
coin or as backing for currency both inside and outside the Treasury
totaled about 650 million ounces in December 1933 and had a nominal
monetary value of $840 million, of which $300 million was in the
form of subsidiary coin. The total market value of the stock of silver at
the time the purchase program began was of course very much smaller,
approximately $285 million, and that figure was some 70 per cent higher
than at the end of 1932. The rather bizarre purchasing price of 64
6%9
cents an ounce was arrived at by adopting the fiction that silver was being
accepted at its monetary value with a seigniorage charge of 50 per cent.
The President's directive to purchase newly mined silver did not stop
agitation for further measures on the part either of those interested pri-
marily in silver or of those who saw silver as a useful device for expanding
the money stock. Numerous bills were introduced providing for additional
action with respect to silver, many coupling that action with the use of
the "seigniorage profits" for specific purposes, such as soldiers' bonus,
purchase of farm products, and the like. The result was the Silver Pur-
chase Act of June 19, 1934, which closely followed recommendations
6
0 An ounce troy equals 480 grains. An ounce of silver is therefore worth
480 divided by 371.25 or $1.2929 ....
6
1 The stock of silver dollars and certificates in and outside the Treasury in-
creased from about $270 million in 1920, when the Treasury began to purchase
silver to replace bullion shipped to India during World War I, to $540 million in
1928, at which amount it remained until the start of the silver-purchase program in
Dec. 1933. Silver certificates in circulation fluctuated with changes in the
public's demand for currency. The stock of subsidiary silver, as well as amounts
in circulation, grew until the 1929-33 contraction.68 NEW DEAL CHANGES
made by the President in a message of May 22, 1934, and which directed
the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver at home and abroad until
the market price reached $1.29-(- an ounce, or until the monetary value
of the silver stock held by the Treasury reached one-third of the monetary
value of the gold stock. The Secretary was given wide discretion in
carrying out that mandate.
A purchase program under the authority of this and subsequent acts was
still legally in effect in 1962, repeated efforts to repeal silver-purchase
legislation having been blocked.
6
2 Under the authority of these acts and the
initial and subsequent Presidential proclamations, the Treasury acquired
some 3,200 million ounces of silver, approximately half in the four years
ending December 31, 1937, and half from then to June 30, 1961.
Of the total, some 110 million ounces was silver that was "nationalized"
on August 9, 1934, when the President required all holders of silver, with
exceptions for silver being used in the arts and for silver coins, to turn
their holdings in to the U.S. Mint at a price equivalent to 50.01 cents per
fine ounce, a measure similar to the nationalization of gold and adopted
for the same reason: to capture for the government profits expected to re-
sult from raising the price of silver.
6
3
Another 880 million ounces was newly mined domestic silver. Since
the Treasury price for newly mined domestic silver until 1955 was higher
than the market price, nearly all domestic silver went to the Treasury
and the demand of American silver users was met by foreign silver. From
then until November 1961, when the Treasury discontinued sales, the
market price approximated the support price, and silver users not only ab-
sorbed current output but also purchased from Treasury stocks. The price
paid by the Treasury for the newly mined domestic silver varied between
64.64 . . . cents and 90.5050 . . . cents an ounce (corresponding to 30
per cent seigniorage). In April 1935, when the market price rose above
64.64 . . . , reaching a peak of over 81 cents at the end of April, the
Treasury twice raised its price, first to a trifle over 71 cents an ounce
(corresponding to 45 per cent seigniorage) then to 77.57 . . . cents (cor-
responding to 40 per cent seigniorage). The market price then fell, par-
6
2 On Jan. 22, 1962, President Kennedy requested Congress to repeal silver-
purchase legislation under which the government is required to buy all newly
mined silver offered to it at the currently fixed price of 90% cents per ounce. He
also called for repeal of the silver transfer tax, under which the government takes
50 per cent of the profit from silver transactions. Legislation embodying the
President's request was passed on June 4, 1963, when this book was in press.
6
3 The one important difference was the recall of gold but not silver from
circulation as coins. The reason for the difference, of course, is that the silver
content of coins even when nominally full-bodied, as the silver dollar is, was
worth less in the market than the face value, and that of subsidiary silver coins de-
cidedly less. (The weight of silver in a silver dollar equals the face value if
silver is valued at $1.2929 ... an ounce; for smaller silver coins the weight
so valued is less than their face value.)NEW DEAL CHANGES 69
ticularly sharply at the end of 1935, and reached a level of 45 cents in
early 1936, but the Treasury price remained 77.57 . . . cents until De-
cember 1937, when it was lowered to the earlier level of 64.64. . . . After
the Presidential proclamation authorizing purchases at that level ex-
pired in June 1939, an act was passed on July 6, 1939, directing the pur-
chase of all domestic silver offered at a seigniorage charge of 45 per cent.
The Treasury's silver purchases dwindled to nearly nothing soon after
we entered the war. By the end of 1945 the market price had risen above
71 cents, so on July 31, 1946, an act was passed reducing seigniorage to
30 per cent—effectively establishing a buying price of 90% cents per
ounce for newly mined domestic silver—and authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to sell nonmonetized (seigniorage or free) silver to domes-
tic industry at not less than 90% cents per ounce.
6
4 As noted above, the
market price rose by 1955 to the neighborhood of the Treasury support
price. From that year until November 1961, sales from Treasury stock
pegged the market price at the Treasury support price. The Treasury
then announced it would end sales on November 28. Once the Treasury
suspended sales, the market price rose above the support price.
6
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The remaining amount purchased by the Treasury, totaling 2,210
million ounces, was silver purchased abroad at prevailing market prices.
All in all, total expenditures for silver from December 31, 1933, to mid-
1961 amounted to roughly $2 billion.
In spite of silver purchases of $2 billion and the accompanying
sextupling of the physical quantity of silver in use as coin and currency
** During World War II, because of increased industrial demand for silver,
some 170 million ounces were sold by the Treasury from nonmonetized silver
in the General Fund, under the Green Act of July 12, 1943, for industrial uses
and for Philippine coinage. The act expired on Dec. 31, 1945. In addition, over
900 million ounces were loaned temporarily to war industries for nonconsumptive
electrical use. Some 410 million ounces were lend-leased to India and other coun-
tries to be returned within five years after the signing of the Japanese Peace
Treaty in April 1952. All but 15 million ounces had been returned by the end
of 1961.
Under the act of 1946, 138 million ounces were sold to industry, mostly after
1958. The reduction of the stock of nonmonetized silver held by the Treasury from
nearly 200 million ounces at the end of 1958 to 22 million ounces when sales
were suspended in 1961 reflected, in addition to sales to industry, withdrawals
for subsidiary silver coinage.
M Within a few weeks after the order suspending sales was issued, the market
price rose to $1.04%. After declining somewhat in early 1962, the price rose to
$1.09 during Aug. 1962, the highest price since Aug. 1920, when the Treasury was
in the market to buy silver to retire Pittman Act certificates (see Chap. 6,
footnote 60), and by June 1963, when this book was in press, to within 1% cents
of the monetary price of $1.2929. . . . When and if the market price of silver
reaches the monetary price, under existing law it will be pegged close to that
price by Treasury redemption of silver certificates, so long as the Treasury's silver
stock holds out, and by melting down of coined silver dollars.70 NEW DEAL CHANGES
or held by the Treasury, the U.S. silver program never came close to
achieving either of the objectives specified in the 1934 Silver Purchase
Act: a market price equal to the monetary value of $1.2929 . . . , or a
ratio of the monetary stocks of silver and gold of 1 to 3. The market price
of silver in 1960 was about 91.4 cents an ounce and had never been much
higher between 1934 and I960.
6
6 The rise from 25 cents an ounce at the
end of 1932 was larger than the concurrent rise in wholesale prices in
general, but not by much. In 1960, the price of silver was 3.7 times the
end-of-1932 level; wholesale prices, 2.9 times. The ratio of monetary silver
to monetary gold stocks, both at their nominal monetary values, was
just over 1 to 5 immediately before the rise in the official price of gold
in January 1934; the change in the gold price reduced the ratio to 1 to 9;
the heavy silver purchases restored the ratio of 1 to 5 by early 1936; until
the war, continued silver purchases on the average just balanced in-
creases in gold stock, so that the ratio fluctuated about that level. Since
then the ratio has been dominated by changes in the gold stock. At the
postwar peak in the gold stock in 1949, the ratio stood at 1 to 7. By the
end of I960, gold outflow had raised the ratio to 1 to 4.
In terms of its domestic effects, the silver-purchase program, like the
gold-purchase program, is best regarded as a price-support program for a
particular commodity, or perhaps a combination of a price-support
program and a stockpiling program. In contrast with gold and as for
wheat, only the price of domestic output has been effectively supported
On the other hand, like gold and in contrast with wheat, purchases have
been made of both domestic output and silver drawn from foreign output
and stocks. Indeed, two and a half times as much has been purchased from
abroad as from domestic output. Again, as with both gold and wheat,
the silver program offers dramatic evidence of the high elasticity of supply
of stockpiled products and the resulting difficulty of substantially altering
their relative prices by a governmental purchase program, even one of
very large size relative to initial output. Domestic silver output more than
tripled—from under 2 million ounces a month to nearly 6 million—in the
four years from the Presidential proclamation of December 21, 1933, to
December 31, 1937, the period covered by that proclamation.
As with gold, the one important domestic monetary element in the
silver program has been the automatic link between silver purchases and
authorization to issue currency. The large so-called seigniorage charge for
"From 1957 to 1961 world monetary and nonmonetary consumption of silver
rose at an annual rate of 4 per cent, world production at an annual rate of about
1.5 per cent. Prices and output of silver would undoubtedly have been higher in
the absence of sales by the U.S. at the support price. World output may be ex-
pected to rise at a faster rate in response to the rise in the market price since the
Treasury suspended sales.NEW DEAL CHANGES 71
newly mined silver, and the difference between the monetary value and
the market price for foreign silver, have meant that silver purchases in-
creased the authorization to issue currency by a considerably larger sum
than the amount paid for the silver. In practice, the Treasury has ap-
parently issued silver certificates equal to the amount actually paid for
the silver, and has treated the excess monetary value as a miscellaneous
budget receipt.
It is not easy to judge the purely domestic monetary effects of the
silver-purchase program. It has involved the printing of additional silver
certificates totaling over $2 billion and so in the first instance has
added this much to the stock of money. However, the Federal Reserve
System has always been in a position to offset this direct effect, and, as
we shall see, the silver purchases to some extent reduced the gold inflow.
The additional silver certificates may therefore have been simply a sub-
stitute for additional Federal Reserve notes which would otherwise have
been printed. In view of the generally passive behavior of the Federal
Reserve System, particularly in the period up to the end of 1937 when
silver purchases were greatest, it is likely that the truth is somewhere be-
tween, and that the silver purchases led to a somewhat more rapid
increase in the stock of money than would otherwise have occurred. In
any event, the sums involved were small compared to either the total in-
crease in the stock of money or the concurrent inflow of gold.
The effects on the United States other than these monetary effects
were twofold. In the first place, the program involved public expenditures
to stockpile a commodity and therefore increased federal government
outlays—not in terms of budget accounts but in terms of economic effects.
The expenditures were not large relative to the government budget. At
their highest, from the end of 1933 through 1937, they averaged $220
million a year (for foreign and domestic silver combined) in comparison
with federal government expenditures of the order of $7 billion a year.
However, they were extremely large in comparison with the outlay of the
industry they were at least partly intended to help. Total domestic silver
output, even valued at the price paid by the Treasury, averaged only
about $40 million a year, 1934-3 7,
6
7 and, of course, the excess of that
value over the returns which the resources employed could have
earned in other ways was much smaller still. Hence, viewed as a
measure to "help" silver producers—including in that term not only
enterprises producing silver but also persons supplying labor and other
resources for production of silver—even the immediate returns from the
silver-purchase program involved gross Treasury expenditures of well over
$5, perhaps as much as $25 or more, for each dollar of return to silver
"Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, Bureau of
the Census, 1960, p. 351, Series M-36.72 NEW DEAL CHANGES
producers, though, for a reason given in the next paragraph, this over-
states the net cost of the program substantially.
6
8 And the long-run effects
of the silver-purchase program have surely offset much of this immediate
gain, if they have not converted it into a loss, by reducing the monetary
use of silver in the rest of the world—a point to which we shall return.
The second effect on the United States, besides the direct effect
on the money stock, was on the balance of international payments. Like
the gold purchases, the silver purchases involved in effect the offer of
dollars for foreign currencies (in order to buy foreign silver), and thereby
helped finance the capital inflow into the United States. In the absence
of the silver purchases, the potential U.S. payments surplus would have
been larger, and hence gold inflows would have been larger as well. Given
our gold policy, therefore, silver purchases were to some extent a
substitute for gold purchases. This offset reduced both the net cost
of the silver program and the amount by which it can be supposed to have
increased the stock of money.
The most important effects of the silver program were not these domes-
tic effects—which, though major in relation to the silver industry, were
relatively minor in relation to the economy as a whole—but the
effects on other countries. The silver program is a dramatic illustration
of how a course of action, undertaken by one country for domestic
reasons and relatively unimportant to that country, can yet have
far-reaching consequences for other countries if it affects a monetary
medium of those countries.
China was most affected. At the time, China was on a silver standard,
though for minor transactions it also used local currencies of copper and
nickel, whose value in silver varied from time to time.
6
9 Because the ex-
change value of silver varied relative to gold, China was spared the initial
effects of the worldwide depression. Its currency depreciated relative to
other currencies, so its internal prices could remain relatively stable despite
the fall in world prices. After Britain's devaluation at the end of 1931,
and still more after the United States' departure from gold in 1933, the
situation changed drastically. China's currency appreciated, the country
was subject to the pressure of internal deflation, and it experienced widen-
ing economic difficulties. The initial pressure was, of course, felt as a
decline in exports relative to imports. The potential deficit in the balance
of payments was met by export of silver, which in its turn tended to con-
6
8 "Well over $5" is obtained by dividing $220 million, peak average annual
Treasury expenditures for silver, by $40 million, annual value of domestic silver
output. "Perhaps as much as $25 or more" is a conjecture that not more than
one-fifth of the $40 million is the excess over the amount that resources employed
in silver output could have earned in alternative uses.
M See Arthur Salter, China and Silver, New York, Economic Forum, 1934 pp.
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tract the internal money supply. The pressure was somewhat eased by the
availability of minor copper and nickel coinage which could change in
value relative to silver, but it is doubtful that the offset was of major
significance.
The U.S. silver-purchase program greatly intensified the pressure on
China. As we have seen, from early 1933 to the end of the year the
market price of silver rose nearly 75 per cent, and by mid-1935, under the
impact of the silver-purchase program, its initial price had nearly trebled.
The effect on China's international trade position can perhaps be
appreciated best by expressing these figures in terms more familiar to
the reader. It was as if, when Britain and the United States were both
on the gold standard in the 1920's, Britain had been confronted over the
course of two years with a rise in the dollar price of the pound sterling
from $4.86 to nearly $15.00, resulting from changes in the U.S. gold
price, without any change in the pound price at which Britain was obli-
gated to sell gold, and without any substantial change in external or in-
ternal circumstances affecting the supply of or demand for products it
purchased or sold. The result of the silver-purchase program, of course,
was to drain China of silver. Its government imposed the equivalent of
an export embargo on silver in an attempt to offset the appreciation of its
currency. Not surprisingly, the legal obstacles to export were of no avail.
Smuggling drained silver from China as rapidly as legal export had
earlier.
7
0 Finally, in November 1935, China nationalized silver in circula-
tion, officially abandoned the silver standard, and replaced it with a
managed fiduciary standard. The new standard specified that a fractional
silver reserve be held by the bank of issue, but it gave the public no right
to redeem notes or deposits in silver.
7
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The owners of silver benefited, of course, from the high foreign ex-
change value of silver. Had silver been simply a commodity, the U.S. pur-
chase program would have been a largely unalloyed boon, enabling the
holders of silver to sell their stocks at an unexpectedly high price. Because
silver served as the monetary base of China, however, students of the
period are unanimous that the boon was more than offset by the economic
effects of the drastic deflationary pressure imposed on China and the
resulting economic disturbances. The deflationary pressure and dis-
turbances, aside from their economic effects, certainly did not contribute
to the political stability of China. Much of the limited stock of political
capacity had to be devoted first to unsuccessful attempts to prevent the
export of silver, then to the sweeping monetary "reform" of 1935. Further-
more, by converting China from a commodity standard effectively to a
™ See Paris, Monetary Policies, p. 66.
" See Frank M. Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, New York, Institute
of Pacific Relations, 1942, pp. 142-150.74 NEW DEAL CHANGES
paper standard, the so-called reform rendered it both easier and more
tempting to finance later war expenditures by inflationary currency issues.
Under pressure of the needs of war and then revolution, China
probably would in any event have departed from silver, resorted to
paper money issues, and have succumbed to hyperinflation. But there
can be little doubt that the effects of U.S. silver policy on China's mone-
tary structure increased the likelihood of those events and speeded up
their occurrence.
Though the Chinese experience is the most dramatic, China was by no
means the only country affected by the silver-purchase program. Mexico,
a major silver producer and user, was led to proclaim a bank holiday in
April 1935 because the bullion value of the peso had risen above its
monetary value. All coins were ordered to be exchanged for paper cur-
rency, and the export of silver money was prohibited. A year and a half
later, after the world price of silver had fallen, silver coinage was re-
stored.
7
2 Similar events occurred in numerous other countries throughout
the world. A U.S. Treasury order in May 1935 prohibiting the import of
foreign silver coins was of course ineffective. It simply meant that the
coins were melted down outside the United States and the bullion shipped
in instead of the melting being done, as earlier, in New York.
A policy undertaken as part of a broader program to promote adop-
tion of "a permanent measure of value, including both gold and silver,
[as] ... a world standard," to quote from President Roosevelt's silver
message of May 22, 1934,
7
3 had the effect of a major diminution in the
worldwide monetary role of silver.
COMPOSITION OF THE CURRENCY
The effect of changes discussed in the preceding sections is in part re-
corded in the figures on the composition of U.S. currency, 1932-60,
in Table 21. From one-sixth of the total currency in circulation, gold has
declined to a negligible sum representing gold certificates lost in the course
of time, held in numismatic collections, or held illegally. The figures
record no coin as in circulation. However, there surely has been some in
these same categories, although since 1955, there have been no limits
on the possession of gold coin, all such coins having been designated rare
coin (see above, footnote 45). Silver, which rose from one-eighth to one-
fourth of total currency during the height of the silver-purchase
program, has continued to rise in absolute amount but so much less
rapidly than the total that it is back to roughly its initial proportion.
National bank notes, accounting for over one-eighth of the currency in
1932, have been in the process of retirement since 1935 and are now a
"Paris, Monetary Policies, p. 71.
" As reproduced by Paris, pp. 187-188.NEW DEAL CHANGES 75
TABLE 21
COMPOSITION OF UNITED STATES CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION, OUTSIDE THE

































1932 5,408 166 716 640 701
1933 5,434 34 265 647 920
1938 6,461 0 78 1,612 217
1945 26,746 0 52 2,565 120
1960 32,065 0 30 3,917 56
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
1932 100.0 3.1 13.2 11.8 13.0
1933 100.0 0.6 4.9 11.9 16.9
1938 100.0 0 1.2 24.9 3.4
1945 100.0 0 0.2 9.6 0.4
1960 100.0 0 0.1 12.2 0.2
a Includes standard silver dollars, silver certificates, Treasury notes of 1890, and
subsidiary silver.
b After Aug. 1935, national bank notes became liabilities of the Treasury on a par
with "other Treasury currency."
e Includes minor coin, U.S. notes, and Federal Reserve Bank notes. Before Mar.
1935, Federal Reserve Bank notes were liabilities of the issuing Reserve Banks.
SOURCE: Circulation Statement of United States Money: 1932—38, Banking and Monetary
Statistics, p. 409; 1945, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug. 1946, p. 889; 1960, FRB, Aug. 1960,
p. 883.
negligible fraction of the total. The variety of items under "other Treas-
ury currency," including minor coin, U.S. notes, and Federal Reserve
Bank notes, has, like silver, risen in absolute amount but fallen as a frac-
tion of the total from over 7 per cent to 3 per cent. Evidencing the con-
tinued centralization of monetary authority, and the shift from a quasi-
commodity standard to a dominantly fiduciary standard, Federal Reserve
notes have taken up the slack, rising from 51 per cent of currency in




4 The Nov. 1961 order suspending silver sales from the Treasury's nonmonetized
stock also directed the Treasury to use the silver cover for silver certificates for
future subsidiary coinage and to replace silver certificates consequently retired by
Federal Reserve notes. Only $5 and $10 denominations were affected by the order.
In Jan. 1962, the President asked Congress to authorize the Federal Reserve
System to issue $1 and $2 Federal Reserve notes to make possible the gradual
retirement of silver certificates of those denominations. The authorization was
included in the act of June 4, 1963, repealing the silver purchase acts.